THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT,
1971
[70 of 1971,
24-12-1971]
An Act to define
and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempts of
courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto
Be
it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-second Year of the Republic of
India as follows:
1. Short title and
extent
(1) This Act may be called
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
(2) It extends to the whole
of India:
PROVIDED
that it shall not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir except to
the extent to which the provisions of this Act relate to contempt of
the Supreme Court.
Definitions
In
this Act,, unless the context otherwise requires—
(a) “contempt of court”
means civil contempt or criminal contempt;
(b) “civil contempt”
means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking
given to a court;
(c) “criminal contempt”
means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by
signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or
the doing of any other act whatsoever which—
(i)
scandalizes, or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the
authority of, any court; or
(ii)
prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course
of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii)
interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;
(d)
“High Court” means the High Court for a State or a Union
territory, and includes the court of the Judicial Commissioner in any
Union territory.
COMMENTS
The
civil court while executing a decree against a judgment debtor is not
concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment and
decree is willful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty
of the court to execute whatever may be the consequence thereof. But
while examining the grievance of the person who has involved the
jurisdiction of the court to initiate a proceeding for contempt for
disobedience of its order, before such contemner is held guilty and
punished, the court has to record a finding that such disobedience
was willful and intentional.—Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana
1994 (6) SCC 332
The
court must always be zealous in preserving its authority and dignity
but at the same time it will be inadvisable to require compliance of
an order impossible of compliance at the instance of the person
proceeded against for contempt.—M.I. Khanday v. A.M. Rather 1994
(4) SCC 34
In a government of laws and not of men the executive branch of
government bears a grave responsibility for upholding and obeying
judicial order.—Mohd. Aslam v. UOI 1994 (6) SCC 442
Where an undertaking is given by a party and accepted by the court
and order passed on the basis of such undertaking, the order in
substance amounts to an injunction restraining the party from acting
in breach thereof.—Noorali v. KMM Shetty AIR 1990 SC 464.
Where there is willful breach of undertaking the court has not only
the power but in appropriate cases, the duty to enforce obedience to
the terms of the undertaking given to it.—Kanta Gupta v. VIII
Additional District Judge Supp 1 SCC 219
Where a case of willful disobedience is made out the court will not
hesitate and will convict the delinquent officer and so lenience in
the attitude of the court should be expected from the court as a
matter of cause merely on the ground that an order of conviction
would damage the service career of the concerned officer.—Tapan
Kumar Mukherjee v. Heromani Mondal AIR 1991 SC 281
Unless
it is shown that the order of the court about which non compliance is
complained is without jurisdiction or void ab initio the parties to
the order are bound to comply with it even though it may be
illegal.—S.M. Kawale v. State of Maharashtra 1994 CrLJ 735
No court including the court of contempt is entitled go take
frivolities and trivialities into account while finding fault with
the conduct of the person against whom contempt proceeding is
taken.-S. Mukhopadhay v. T.D. Karam Chandani 1995 (75) ELT 39
Liberty of free expression is not to be conferred with a licence to
make unfounded, unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the
judges or the courts in relation to judicial matters.—In re
Roshan Lal Ahuja 1993 Supp 446
If freedom of expression sub serves public interest cannot gag it or
manacle it; but if the court considered the attack on the Judge or
judges successions, offensive, intimidatory or malicious, beyond
condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must strike a blow on
him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its
source and stream.—C. Ranichandran lyer v. Justice A.M.
Bhattchargee 1995 (5) SCC 457
Making wild allegations of corruption against the presiding officer
amounts to scandalizing the court. Imputation of motives of
corruption to the judicial officer/authority by any person or group
of persons is a serious inroad into the efficacy of judicial process
and threat to judicial independence and needs to be dealt with the
strong arm of law.—U.P. Sales Tax Service Association v.
Taxation Bar Association 1995 (5) SCC 716
The
fact that the order appointing the receiver is improperly procured is
no justification for interfering with him since the validity can be
challenged by application to the court.—In re Mukunda Chandra
Halder 1994 CrLJ (NOC) 189
Contempt is essentially a matter
for the court concerned. Such a jurisdiction is vested in the court
in order that the majesty of law can be upheld. If any interference
is made or sought to be made in the course of justice, the court must
take serious view of the same.—Rakesh Kaul v. Registrar, High
Court of J&K 1994 (5) SCC 759
Anyone who makes or attempts to
impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream
of justice by resorting to the filing of false evidence, commits
criminal contempt of court and renders himself liable to be dealt
with in accordance with the Act. Filing of false affidavits or
making a false statement on oath in courts aim at striking a blow at
the rule of law and no court can ignore such conduct which has the
tendency to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions
because the very structure of an ordered life is put at
steak.—Dhanjay Sharma v. State or Haryana 1995 (3) SCC 757
3. Innocent publication and
distribution of matter not contempt
(1) A person shall not be
guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has published
(whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representations, or otherwise) any matter which interferes or tends
to interfere with, or obstructs, ot tends to obstruct, the course of
justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding pending
at that time of publication, if at that time he had no reasonable
grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending.
(2) Notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in this Act or any other law for the time
being in force, the publication of any such matter as is mentioned in
sub-section (1) in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding
which is not pending at the time of publication shall not be deemed
to constitute contempt of court.
(3) A person shall not be
guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has distributed a
publication containing any such matter as is mentioned in sub-section
(1), if at the time of distribution he had no reasonable grounds for
believing that it contained or was likely to contain any such matter
as aforesaid:
PROVIDED that this
sub-section shall not apply in respect of the distribution of—
(i) any publication which is
a book or paper printed or published otherwise than in conformity
with the rules contained in section 3 of the Press and Registration
of Books Act, 1867, (25 of 1867);
(ii) any publication which is
a newspaper published otherwise than in conformity with the rules
contained in section 5 of the said Act.
Explanation:
For the purposes of this section, a judicial proceeding—
(b) is said to be pending—
i.
in the case of a civil proceeding, when it is instituted by the
filing of a plaint or otherwise,
ii. in
the case of a criminal proceeding under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)¹(see Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973), or any other law—
(a) where it relates to the
commission of an offence, when the charge sheet or challan is filed,
or when the court issues summons or warrant, as the case may be,
against the accused, and
(b) in any other case, when
the court takes cognizance of the matter to which the proceeding
relates, and n the case of a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be
deemed to continue to be pending until it is heard and finally
decided, that is to say, in a case where an appeal or revision is
competent, until the appeal or revision is heard and finally decided
or, where no appeal or revision has expired:
(c) which has been heard
and finally decided shall not be deemed to be pending merely by
reason of the fact that proceedings for the execution of the decree,
order or sentence passed therein are pending.
COMMENTS
Sec. 3 is in nature of an
exception to the categories of “criminal contempt” which fall
under sub-clause (ii) and to certain categories of “criminal
contempt” which fall under sub-clause (iii) of s. 2(c) but not to
that category of contempt which falls under sub-clause (i) of s. 2
(c).—Rachpudi S. Rao v. Advocate General AIR 1981 SC 755
It depends upon the subjective
state of mind of not knowing of pendency and the objecting
demonstration by the person concerned that he had no reasonable
grounds for believing that any such proceeding was pending.—Pending
v. Standard Trimbak Yardi 1975 CrLJ 531
4.
Fair and accurate report of Judicial proceeding not contempt
Subject to the provisions
contained in section 7, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of
court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial
proceeding or any stage thereof.
COMMENTS
Reading s. 4 with the
provision of s. 7 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it is clear
that what is meant by the words “judicial proceedings” is day to
day proceeding of the court. Assuming though not granting that it is
capable of a wideraconstruction, it only permits a publication of
“fair and accurate” report of a judicial proceeding.—Subash
Chandra v. S.M. Agarwal 1984 CrLJ 481
Before a party to a litigation
may be heard in support of its case, it must punge itself of the
contempt that tends to impede the course of justice by the contempt
that has to be punged should be an admitted or proved contempt and
not merely an alleged contempt.—Arun Tandon v. Insurance Co.
Ltd. 1983 Cr.LJ 459
5.
Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt
A person shall not be guilty
of contempt of court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of
any case which has been heard and finally decided.
COMMENTS
Judges and courts are not unduly
sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of their
judgments fair comments even if outspoken but made without maturity
or attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in
good faith in proper language do not attract any punishment for
contempt of court.—In re Roshan Lal Ahuja 1993 Supp 4 SCC 446
In a democracy fair criticism
of the working of all the organs of State should be welcome and would
in fact promote the interests of democratic functioning. Sec. 5 of
the Act evidently enacted with a view to secure the right of fair
criticism provides that a person shall not be guilty of contempt of
court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of the case which
has been heard and finally decided. This does not mean that the right
to commit for any contempt by scandalizing the court has become
obsolete. The question would still be whether the publication alleged
to be offending is by way of fair comment on the merits of the
case.—Vincent Panikulangara v. Gopal Kurup 1982 CrLJ 2094
In the case of issuance of
mere notice of contempt, the right of hearing cannot be denied.
Refusing a right of hearing to a party against whom merely a notice
for contempt has been issued is fraught with grave injstice.—Arun
Tendan v. Insurance Co. Ltd. 1983 Cr LJ 459
6. Complaint against
presiding officers of subordinate courts when not contempt
A person shall not be guilty
of contempt of court in respect of any statement made by him in good
faith concerning the presiding officer of any subordinate court to—
(a) any other subordinate
court, or
(b) the High Court,
to
which it is subordinate.
Explanation:
In this section, “subordinate court” means any court subordinate
to a High Court.
COMMENTS
Unwarranted and defamatory
attack upon the character and ability of the Judge made by the
counsel in the application of transfer of proceedings from the said
court does not constitute a mere complaint under s. 6 of the Contempt
of Court Act, but clearly constitutes criminal contempt by
scandalizing the court within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971.—State of M.P. v. Chandrakant Saraf 1985
CrLJ 1716
7.
Publication of information relating to proceeding in chambers or in
camera not contempt except in certain cases
(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, a person shall not be guilty of
contempt of court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a
judicial proceeding before any court sitting in chambers or in camera
except in the following cases, that is to say--
(a) where the publication is
contrary to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in
force;
(b) where the court, on
ground of public policy or in exercise of any power vested in it,
expressly prohibits the publication of all information relating to
the proceeding or of information of the description which is
published;
(c) where the court sits in
chambers on in camera for reason connected with public order or the
security of the State, the publication of information relating to
those proceedings;
(d) where the information
relates to a secret process, discovery or invention which is an issue
in proceedings.
(2) Without prejudice to the
provisions contained in sub-section (1), a person shall not be guilty
of contempt of court for publishing the text or a fair and accurate
summary of the whole or any part, of an order made by a court sitting
in chambers or in camera, unless the court has expressly prohibited
the publication thereof on grounds of public policy, or for reasons
connected with public order or the security of the State, or on the
ground that it contains information relating to a secret process,
discovery or invention, or in exercise of any power vested in it.
COMMENTS
The press reporter and the
publisher of newspapers do not have any indefeasible right to put his
own gloss on the statements in court by selecting stray passages out
of context which might have a tendency to convey to the reader to the
prejudice of a party to the proceedings a cause different from what
would appear when the statement is read in its own
context.—Progressive Port and Dock Workers Union v. K.M. Mathew
1984 CrLJ 1061
8. Other defences not
affected
Nothing contained in this
Act shall be construed as implying that any other defence which would
have been a valid defence in any proceedings for contempt of court
has ceased to be available merely by reason of the provisions of this
Act.
COMMENTS
If there is specific
time limit in the direction, such non compliance cannot be regarded
as willful or deliberate disregard of such direction.—Atmaram
Kanosir v. L.K.R. Prasad 1990 Cr LJ 169
The power to
inflict punishment for contempt of court cannot be invalidated on the
ground that law which does not allow plea of truth as a defence is in
contravention of Act. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution—V.M.
Kanade v. Madhav Godkari 1990 Cr. LJ 190
While ss. 3 to 7
mentions special acts that are not contempt, s. 8 by implication
indicated that the Act is not exhausted as to what is not
contempt.—High Court v. T.K. Subamma 1990 Cr LJ 1159
An intention
to interfere with the administration of justice is not an essential
ingredient to the offence of contempt of court. It is enough if the
action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere.—Pritam
Pal v. High Court M.P. AIR 1992 SC 904
Truth of the
allegation when the contemner says that he can prove, cannot be put
up as a defence in charge for contempt of court.—V.M. Kande v.
Madhav Gadkari 1990 CrLJ 190
9. Act not to imply
enlargement of scope of contempt
Nothing contained
in this Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience,
breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt of court
which would not be punishable apart from this Act.
COMMENTS
What s. 9 contemplates
is that an act or action which was not contempt of court before the
Act came into force shall not be punishable as contempt of court
under the Act.—Harish Chandra Mishra v. Justice S. Ali Ahmed AIR
1986 Pat 65
Sec. 9 makes is
absolutely clear that it is only such disobedience that is made
punishable as contempt of court which is made specifically punishable
under the Act. There is no provision in the Act like s. 34 or s. 114
of the Indian Penal Code with the aid of which aiding or abetting can
be punished.—Sham Kant v. Dayana Bai 1989 Cr LJ 2431
10. Power of High Court
to punish contempts of subordinate courts
Every
High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and
authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in
respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and
exercises in respect of contempts of itself:
PROVIDED
that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to
have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where
such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860).
CONTEMPTS
Where
the misconduct complained of falls under Contempt of Courts Act as
well as Penal Code, independent of each other, the accused can be
punished for contempt even if he has once bee punished under s. 228
of the Penal Code for the act committed by him, and the principle of
double jeopardy is in applicable in the case.—Court on its own
motion v. Milkhi Ram 1992 Cr LJ 2130
Power
to punish the contemner for itself which is inherent in the court of
reward includes power to dismiss the case for contempt. When it has
power to dismiss on merit it has the power to dismiss for default.
Equally as an adjunct or incidental thereto, it has also inherent
power to restore the application dismissed for default.—D. V.K.
Kesva Raju v. S.R. Govinda 1990 Cr LJ 299
The
corporate veil is being blatantly used as a clock is willfully
disobey the orders of the court.Lifting the corporate veil is
imperative to punish improper conduct. It is the requirement of
public interest that the corporate veil must be lifted to find out
the person who disobeyed the order of the court.—yoti Ltd. V.
K.K. Bhasin 1987 Cr LJ 1281
11.
Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found
outside jurisdiction
A
High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt
of itself or of any court subordinate to it, whether the contempt is
alleged to have been committed within or outside the local limits of
its jurisdiction, and whether the person alleged to be guilty of
contempt is within or outside such limits.
CONTEMPTS
It
is of utmost importance that there has to be a specific order of
restraint against a person from indulging in a particular type of
activity, the violation of which can make him liable for contempt.
Where there is no prayer made for restraining the defendant from
doing a particular act, mere status quo will not include such act and
one will not be guilty of contempt.—S. Anand Deep Singh v.
Ranjit Kumar 1991 Cr LJ 996
12.
Punishment for contempt of court
(1)
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other
law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for
a term which may extend to six months, or with find which may extend
to two thousand rupees, or with both:
PROVIDED
that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be
remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation:
An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is
qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in
force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified
in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of
a court subordinate to it.
(3)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is
found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a
fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of
imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple
imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such
period not exceeding six months as it may be think fit.
(4)
Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any
undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the
time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the
company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the
court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person:
PROVIDED
that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such
person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was
committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due
diligence to prevent its commission.
(5)
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the
contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company
and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the
consent or connivance, of, or is attributable to any neglect on the
part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the
company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall
also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be
enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil
prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
Explanation:
For the purpose of such-sections (4) and (5)—
(a)
“company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals; and
(b) “director’, in
relation to a firm, means partner in the firm
COMMENTS
Those
who have to discharge duty in a court of justice are protected by the
law are shielded in the discharge of their duties, any deliberate
interference in the discharge of such duties either in court or
outside the court by attacking the presiding officer of the court
would amount to criminal contempt and the court must take serious
cognizance of such conduct.—Delhi Judicial Service Association
v. State of Gujarat AIR 1991 SC 2176
In
a case where a senior IAS officer after having been found guilty of
contempt for deliberately not implementing the order of the Supreme
Court was sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of one month,
the court observed that, if the order of even the highest court of
the land is allowed to be willfully disobeyed and a person found
guilty of contempt is let off by remitting the sentence on plea of
mercy, that would send wrong signals to everybody in the country.—J
Vasudavan v. T.R. Dhananjaya 1995 (6) SCC 249
The
contemner cannot be let off or an apology which is far from sincere,
hollow no remorse, no regret, and merely a device to escape the
rigour of the law.—M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of P&H AIR 1981
SC 1834
An
apology is not a weapon of the defence forged to purge the guilt of
the offences nor is it intended to operate as panacea. It is
intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness
of a wrong done, if an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to
make such separation as lies in the wrongdoer’s power.—DDA v.
Skipper Construction 1995 (3) SCC 507
It
is essential to take strong measures to see that justice becomes
available to all, who would not get it if lawful orders of competent
courts are violated which would result in people with muscle and
money power alone being able to settle score on streets.—State
of Orissa v. Bisaya Mohanty 1993 Cr LJ 3311
In
the instant case the court held the contemner, Shri Vinay Chandra
Mishra guilty of the offence of the criminal contempt of the court
for having interfered with and obstructed the course of justice by
trying to threaten, over awe and overbear the court by using
insulting disrespectful and threatening language and committed him of
the said offence. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Act 129
is sui generis. The jurisdiction to take cognizance by any statute.
Neither the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 nor the Advocates Act, 1961,
can be preserved into service to restrict the said jurisdiction.—Ir
re Vinayachandra Mishra 1995 (2) SCC 584
Where
the allegation is one of the disobedience of the order of the court
where it is not possible to attribute definite knowledge of order of
the court to party proceeded against, the party shall be
exonerated.—M.J. Maulana Hasan Ali v. Amiruddin 1992 Cr LJ 1986
The
order of holding a person guilty of having committed contempt of
court cannot be reviewed by the court which is amenable to correction
in an appeal under s. 19 of the Act.—Senior Sub Judge v. R. A.
Kawzal 1991 Cr LJ 2432
The
Supreme Court being the apex court and a superior court of record has
power to determine its jurisdiction under article 129 of the
Constitution and it has jurisdiction to initiate or entertain
proceedings for contempt of subordinate courts.—Delhi Judicial
Service Association v. State of Gujarat 1991 Cr LJ 3086
Where
the unconditional apology is offered it has its due reflection on the
question of punishment and it cannot completely absolute
contempt.—1990 SCC (Cri) 626
Apology
must be such as serving a large purpose, as a deterrent to those who
treat the orders of the court with callous disregard or indifference.
The ritualistic and formal apology in affidavit is not
sufficient.—K.P. Isar & Sons (P) Ltd. V. K. Prathydhanan
1992 Cr LJ 2587
