CASE
NO.:Writ Petition (civil) 317 of 1993
PETITIONER:T.M.A. Pai
Foundation &Ors.
RESPONDENT:State of Karnataka
&Ors.
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 31/10/2002
BENCH:
C.J.I., G.B. Pattanaik, S.
RajendraBabu, K.G. Balakrishnan, P. VenkataramaReddi&ArijitPasayat.
J U D G M E N T
W
I T H
Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.
252 of 1979, 54-57, 2228 of 1981, 2460, 2582, 2583-84,3362, 3517, 3602, 3603,
3634, 3635, 3636, 8398, 8391, 5621, 5035, 3701, 3702,3703, 3704, 3715, 3728,
4648, 4649, 2479, 2480, 2547 and 3475 of 1982, 7610,4810, 9839 and 9683-84 of
1983, 12622-24 of 1984, 119 and 133 of 1987, 620 of1989, 133 of 1992, 746, 327,
350, 613, 597, 536, 626, 444, 417, 523, 474, 485, 484,355, 525, 469, 392, 629,
399, 531, 603, 702, 628, 663, 284, 555, 343, 596, 407, 737,738, 747, 479, 610,
627, 685, 706, 726, 598, 482 and 571 of 1993, 295, 764 andD. No. 1741 of 1994,
331, 446 and 447 of 1995, 364 and 435 of 1996, 456, 454,447 and 485 of 1997,
356, 357 and 328 of 1998, 199, 294, 279, 35, 181, 373, 487and 23 of 1999, 561
of 2000, 6 and 132 of 2002, Civil Appeal Nos. 1236-1241 and2392 of 1977, 687 of
1976, 3179, 3180, 3181, 3182, 1521-56, 3042-91 of 1979,2929-31, 1464 of 1980,
2271 and 2443-46 of 1981, 4020, 290 and 10766 of 1983,5042 and 5043 of 1989,
6147 and 5381 of 1990, 71, 72 and 73 of 1991, 1890-91,2414 and 2625 of 1992,
4695-4746, 4754-4866 of 1993, 5543-5544
of 1994, 8098-8100 and 11321 of 1995, 4654-4658 of 1997, 608, 3543 and
3584-3585 of 1998,5053-5054 of 2000,
5647, 5648-5649, 5650, 5651, 5652, 5653-5654, 5655, 5656 of2001 and 2334 of
2002, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9950 and 9951
of 1979, 11526 and 863of 1980, 12408 of
1985, 8844 of 1986, 12320 of 1987,
14437, 18061-62 of 1993,
904-05 and 11620 of
1994, 23421 of 1995, 4372 of 1996,
10360 and 10664 of
1997, 1216, 9779-9786, 6472-6474 and 9793 of
1998, 5101, 4480 and 4486 of
2002 T.C. (Civil) No. 26 of 1990 and T.P. (Civil)
Nos. 1013-14 of 1993.
KIRPAL, C.J.I.
1. India is a land of diversity of different castes, peoples,
communities,languages, religions and culture.
Although these people enjoy complete politicalfreedom, a vast part of
the multitude is illiterate and lives below the poverty line.The single most
powerful tool for the upliftment and progress of such diversecommunities is
education. The state, with its limited
resources and slow-movingmachinery, is unable to fully develop the genius of
the Indian people. Very
often,the impersonal education that is imparted by the state, devoid of
adequate materialcontent that will make the students self-reliant, only
succeeds in producingpotential pen-pushers, as a result of which sufficient
jobs are not available.
2. It is in this scenario where there is a lack of
quality education and adequate number of schools
and colleges that private educational institutions havebeen established by
educationists, philanthropists and religious and linguisticminorities. Their grievance is that the unnecessary and
unproductive load on theirback in the form of governmental control, by way of
rules and regulations, hasthwarted the progress of quality education. It is their contention that thegovernment
must get off their back, and that they should be allowed to providequality
education uninterrupted by unnecessary rules and regulations, laid down bythe
bureaucracy for its own self-importance.
The private educational institutions,both aided and unaided, established
by minorities and non-minorities, in theirdesire to break free of the
unnecessary shackles put on their functioning as moderneducational institutions
and seeking to impart quality education for the benefit ofthe community for
whom they were established, and others, have filed the presentwrit petitions
and appeals asserting their right to establish and administereducational
institutions of their choice unhampered by rules and regulations that unnecessarily impinge upon
their autonomy.
3. The hearing of these cases has had a chequered
history. Writ PetitionNo.350 of 1993
filed by the Islamic Academy of Education and connectedpetitions were placed
before a Bench of 5 Judges. As the Bench
was prima facieof the opinion that Article 30 did not clothe a minority
educational institution withthe power to adopt its own method of selection and
the correctness of the decisionof this Court in St. Stephen's College vs.
University of Delhi [(1992) 1 SCC 558]was doubted, it was directed that the
questions that arose should be authoritativelyanswered by a larger Bench. These cases were then placed before a Bench
of 7Judges. The questions framed were recast and on 6th February, 1997, the
Courtdirected that the matter be placed before a Bench of at least 11 Judges,
as it wasfelt that in view of the Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution,
whereby "education" had been included in Entry 25 of List III of the
Seventh Schedule, thequestion of who would be regarded as a
"minority" was required to be consideredbecause the earlier case laws
related to the pre-amendment era, when educationwas only in the State
List. When the cases came up for hearing
before an elevenJudge Bench, during the course of hearing on 19th March, 1997,
the followingorder was passed:-
"Since a doubt has
arisen during the course of our arguments as to whether this Bench would feel
itself bound by the ratio propounded in
In Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (1959 SCR 955) and the Ahmedabad St.
Xaviers College Society vs. State of Gujarat, 1975(1) SCR 173, it is clarified
that this sized Bench would not feel itself inhibited by the views expressed in
those cases since the
present endeavour is to
discern the true scope and interpretation of Article 30(1) of the Constitution,
which being the dominant question would require examination in its pristine
purity. The factum is recorded."
4. When the hearing of these cases commenced, some
questions out ofthe eleven referred for consideration were reframed. We propose
to give answers tothese questions after examining the rival contentions on the
issues arising therein.
5. On behalf of all these institutions, the learned
counsels have submittedthat the Constitution provides a fundamental right to establish
and administereducational institutions.
With regard to non-minorities, the right was stated to becontained in
Article 19(1)(g) and/or Article 26, while in the case of linguistic
andreligious minorities, the submission was that this right was enshrined and
protectedby Article 30. It was further
their case that private educational institutions shouldhave full autonomy in
their administration. While it is
necessary for aneducational institution to secure recognition or affiliation,
and for which purposerules and regulations or conditions could be prescribed
pertaining to therequirement of the quality of education to be provided, e.g.,
qualifications ofteachers, curriculum to be taught and the minimum facilities
which should beavailable for the students, it was submitted that the state
should not have a right to interfere or lay down conditions with regard to the
administration of those institutions. In particular, objection was taken to the
nominations by the state on the governing bodies of the private institutions,
as well as to provisions with regard to the manner of admitting students, the
fixing of the fee structure and recruitment of teachers through state channels.
6. The counsels for these educational institutions,
as well as the Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the Union of
India, urged that the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. and Others
vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others [(1993) 1 SCC 645] case required
reconsideration. It was submitted that the
scheme that had been framed in Unni Krishnan's case had imposed unreasonable
restrictions on the administration of the private educational institutions, and
that especially in the case of minority institutions, the right guaranteed to
them under Article 30(1) stood infringed. It was also urged that the object
that was sought to be achieved by the scheme was, in fact, not achieved.
7. On behalf of the private minority institutions,
it was submitted that on the correct interpretation of the various provisions
of the Constitution, and Articles 29 and 30 in particular, the minority
institutions have a right to establish and administer educational institutions
of their choice. The use of the phrase
"of their choice" in Article 30(1) clearly postulated that the religious
and linguistic minorities could establish and administer any type of
educational institution, whether it was a school, a degree college or a
professional college; it was argued that such an educational institution is
invariably established primarily for the benefit of the religious and
linguistic minority, and it should be open to such institutions to admit
students of their choice. While Article
30(2) was meant to ensure that these minority institutions would not be denied
aid on the ground that they were managed by minority institutions, it was
submitted that no condition which curtailed or took away the minority character
of the institution while granting aid could be imposed. In particular, it was
submitted that Article 29(2) could not be applied or so interpreted as to
completely obliterate the right of the minority institution to grant admission
to the students of its own religion or language. It was also submitted that while secular laws
relating to health, town planning, etc., would be applicable, no other rules
and regulations could be framed that would in any way curtail or interfere with
the administration of the minority educational institution. It was emphasized by the learned counsel that
the right to administer an educational institution included the right to
constitute a governing body, appoint teachers and admit students. It was further submitted that these were the
essential ingredients of the administration of an educational institution, and
no fetter could be put on the
exercise of the right to administer. It was conceded that for the purpose of
seeking recognition, qualifications of teachers could be stipulated, as also the
qualifications of the students who could be admitted; at the same time, it was
argued that the manner and mode of appointment of teachers and selection of
students had to be within the exclusive domain of the educational institution.
8. On behalf of the private non-minority unaided
educational institutions, it was
contended that since secularism and equality were part of the basic structure
of the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted
so that the rights of the private non-minority unaided institutions were the
same as that of the minority institutions.It was submitted that while reasonable
restrictions could be imposed under Article 19(6), such private institutions
should have the same freedom of administration of an unaided institution as was
sought by the minority unaided institutions.
9. The learned Solicitor General did not dispute the
contention that the right to establish an institution had been conferred on the
non-minorities by Articles 19 and 26, and on the religious and linguistic
minorities by Article 30. He agreed with
the submission of the counsels for the appellants that the Unni Krishnan
decision required reconsideration, and that the private unaided educational institutions
were entitled to greater autonomy. He,
however,contended that Article
29(2) was applicable to minority institutions, and the claim of the minority
institutions that they could preferably admit students of their own religion or
language to the exclusion of the other communities was impermissible. In other
words, he submitted that Article 29(2) made it obligatory even on the minority
institutions not to deny admission on the ground of religion, race, caste, language
or any of them.
10. Several States have totally disagreed with the
arguments advanced by the learned Solicitor General with regard to the
applicability of Article 29(2) and 30(1). The
States of Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Rajasthan have submitted that the
words "their choice" in Article 30(1) enabled the minority
institutions to admit members of the minority community, and that the inability
of the minority institutions to admit others as a result of the exercise of
"their choice" would not amount to a denial as contemplated under
Article 29(2). The State of Andhra Pradesh has not expressly referred to the
inter-play between Article 29(2) and Article 30(1), but has stated that
"as the minority educational institutions are intended to benefit the
minorities, a restriction that at least 50 per cent of the students admitted
should come from the particular minority, which has established the institution, should be
stipulated as a working rule", and that an institution which fulfilled the
following conditions should be regarded as minority educational institutions:
1. All the office bearers, members of the executive committee of
the society must necessarily belong to the concerned religious/linguistic
minority without
exception.
2. The institution should admit only the concerned minority
candidates to the extent of sanctioned
intake permitted to be filed by the respective managements. and that the
Court "ought to permit the State to regulate the intake in minority educational
institutions with due regard to the need of the community in the area which the
institution is intended to serve. In no
case should such intake exceed 50% of the total admissions every year."
11. The State of Kerala has submitted, again without
express reference to Article 29(2), "that the constitutional right of the
minorities should be extended to professional education also, but while
limiting the right of the minorities to admit students belonging to their community
to 50% of the total intake of each minority institution".
12. The State of Karnataka has submitted that "aid
is not a matter of right but receipt thereof does not in any way dilute the
minority character of the institution.
Aid can be distributed on non-discriminatory conditions but in so far as
minority institutions are concerned, their core rights will have to be
protected.
13. On the other hand, the States of Tamil Nadu,
Punjab, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have submitted that
Article 30(1) is subject to Article 29(2), arguing that a minority institution
availing of state aid loses the right to admit members of its community on the
basis of the need of the community.
14. The Attorney General, pursuant to the request made by
the court,
made submissions on the
constitutional issues in a fair and objective manner. We record our appreciation for the assistance
rendered by him and the other learned counsel.
15. We may observe here that the counsels were informed
that it was not necessary for this Bench to decide four of the questions
framed, relating to the issue of who could be regarded as religious minorities;
no arguments were
addressed
in respect thereto.
16. From the arguments aforesaid, five main issues
arise for consideration in these cases, which would encompass all the eleven
questions framed that are required to be answered.
17. We will first consider the arguments of the learned
counsels under these heads before dealing
with the questions now remaining to be answered.
1. IS THERE A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SET UP EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND IF SO, UNDER WHICH PROVISION?
18. With
regard to the establishment of educational institutions, three Articles of the
Constitution come into play. Article
19(1)(g) gives the right to all the citizens to practice any profession or to
carry on any occupation, trade or business; this right is subject to
restrictions that may be placed under Article 19(6). Article 26 gives the right
to every religious denomination to establish and maintain an institution for
religious purposes, which would include an educational institution. Article 19(1)(g) and Article 26, therefore,
confer rights on all citizens and religious denominations to establish and
maintain educational institutions. There was no serious dispute that the
majority community as well as linguistic and religious minorities would have a
right under Articles 19(1)(g) and 26 to establish educational institutions. In
addition, Article 30(1), in no uncertain terms, gives the right to the
religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice.
19. We will first consider the right to establish and
administer an educational institution
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and deal with the right to
establish educational institutions under Article 26 and 30 in the next part of the
judgment while considering the rights of the minorities.
20. Article 19(1)(g) employs four expressions, viz.,
profession, occupation, trade and
business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does have a content of its
own. Education is per se regarded as an
activity that is charitable in nature [See The State of Bombay vs. R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala, (1957) SCR 874: AIR (1957)
SC 699]. Education has so far not been
regarded as a trade or business where profit is the motive. Even if there is any doubt about whether education is a
profession or not, it does appear that education will fall within the meaning of the
expression "occupation".
Article 19(1)(g) uses the four expressions so as to cover all activities
of a citizen in respect of which income or profit is generated, and which can
consequently be regulated under Article 19(6). In Webster's Third New
International Dictionary at page 1650, "occupation" is, inter alia,
defined as "an activity in which one engages" or "a craft,
trade, profession or other means of earning a living".
21. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume LXVII, the word
"occupation" is
defined as under:-
"The word
"occupation" also is employed as referring to that which occupies
time and attention; a calling; or a trade; and it is only as employed in this
sense that the word is discussed in the following paragraphs. There is nothing
ambiguous about the word "occupation" as it is used in the sense of
employing one's time. It is a relative
term, in common use with a well-understood meaning, and very broad in its scope
and significance. It is described as a
generic and very comprehensive term, which includes every species of the genus,
and compasses the incidental, as well as the main, requirements of one's
vocation, calling, or business. The word
"occupation" is variously defined as meaning the principal business
of one's life; the principal or usual business in which a man engages; that
which principally takes up one's time, thought, and energies; that which
occupies or engages the time and attention; that particular business,
profession, trade, or calling which engages the time and efforts of an
individual; the employment in which one engages, or the vocation of one's life;
the state of being occupied or employed in any way; that activity in which a
person, natural or artificial, is engaged with the element of a degree of permanency
attached."
22. A
Five Judge Bench in Sodan Singh and Others vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Others [(1989) 4 SCC 155] at page
174, para 28, observed as follows: "The word occupation has a wide
meaning such as any regular work, profession, job, principal activity,
employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged. The object of
using four analogous and overlapping words in Article 19(1)(g) is to make the
guaranteed right as comprehensive as possible to include all the avenues and
modes through which a man may earn his livelihood. In a nutshell the guarantee takes into its fold any
activity carried on by a citizen of India to earn his living.".
23. In Unni Krishnan's case, at page 687, para 63,
while referring to education, it was observed
as follows:- ".It may perhaps fall under the category of occupation
provided no recognition is sought from the State or affiliation from the University
is asked on the basis that it is a fundamental right."
24. While the conclusion that "occupation"
comprehends the establishment of educational institutions is correct, the
proviso in the aforesaid observation to the effect that this is so provided no
recognition is sought from the state or affiliation from the concerned
university is, with the utmost respect, erroneous. The fundamental right to establish an
educational institution cannot be confused with the right to ask for
recognition or affiliation. The exercise
of a fundamental right may be controlled in a variety of ways. For example, the right to carry on a business
does not entail the right to carry on a business at a particular place. The right to carry on a business may
be subject to licensing laws so that a denial of the licence prevents a person
from carrying on that particular business. The question of whether there is a
fundamental right or not cannot be dependent upon whether it can be made the
subject matter of controls.
25. The establishment and running of an educational
institution where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or
administrative staff, and an activity is carried on that results in the
imparting of knowledge to the students, must necessarily be regarded as an
occupation, even if there is no element of profit generation. It is difficult to comprehend that education,
per se, will not fall under any of the four expressions in Article
19(1)(g). "Occupation" would
be an activity of a person undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in
life. The above quoted observations in
Sodan Singh's case correctly interpret the expression "occupation" in
Article 19(1)(g).
26. The right to establish and maintain educational
institutions may also be sourced to Article 26(a), which grants, in positive
terms, the right to every religious denomination or any section thereof to
establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes,
subject to public order, morality and health. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore, religious denominations or sections
thereof, which do not fall within the special categories carved out in Article
29(1) and 30(1), have the right to establish and maintain religious and educational
institutions. This would allow members
belonging to any religious denomination, including the majority religious
community, to set up an educational institution. Given this, the phrase "private
educational institution" as used in this judgment would include not only
those educational institutions set up by secular persons or bodies, but also
educational institutions set up by religious denominations; the word
"private" is used in contradistinction to government institutions.
2. DOES UNNIKRISHNAN'S CASE REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION?
27. In the case of Mohini Jain (Miss) vs. State of
Karnataka and Others (1992) 3 SCC 666], the
challenge was to a notification of June 1989, which provided for a fee
structure, whereby for government seats, the tuition fee was Rs.2,000 per
annum, and for students from Karnataka, the fee was Rs.25,000 per annum, while
the fee for Indian students from outside Karnataka, under the payment category,
was Rs.60,000 per annum. It had been
contended that charging such a discriminatory and high fee violated
constitutional guarantees and rights. This attack was sustained, and it was
held that there was a fundamental right to education in every citizen, and that
the state was duty bound to provide the education, and that the private
institutions that discharge the state's duties were equally bound not to charge
a higher fee than the government institutions.
The Court then held that any prescription of fee in excess of what was
payable in government colleges was a capitation fee and would, therefore, be
illegal. The correctness of this
decision was challenged in Unni Krishnan's case, where it was contended that if
Mohini Jain's ratio was applied, the educational institutions would have to be
closed down, as they would be wholly unviable without appropriate funds, by way
of tuition fees, from their students.
28. We will now examine the decision in Unni Krishnan's
case. In this case, this Court
considered the conditions and regulations, if any, which the state could impose
in the running of private unaided/aided recognized or affiliated educational
institutions conducting professional courses such as medicine, engineering,
etc. The extent to which the fee could
be charged by such an institution, and the manner in which admissions could be
granted was also considered. This Court
held that private unaided recognized/affiliated educational institutions
running professional courses were entitled to charge a fee higher than that
charged by government institutions for similar courses, but that such a fee could
not exceed the maximum limit fixed by the state. It held that commercialization of education was not permissible,
and "was opposed to public policy and Indian tradition and therefore
charging capitation fee was illegal." With regard to private aided
recognized/affiliated educational institutions, the Court upheld the power of
the government to frame rules and regulations in matters of admission and fees,
as well as in matters such as recruitment and conditions of service of teachers
and staff. Though a question was raised
as to whether the setting up of an educational institution could be regarded as
a business, profession or vocation under Article 19(1)(g), this question was
not answered. Jeevan Reddy, J., however, at page 751, para 197, observed as
follows:-
".While we do not
wish to express any opinion on the question whether the right to establish an
educational institution can be said to be carrying on any
"occupation" within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g), - perhaps, it
is we are certainly of the opinion that
such activity can neither be a trade or business nor can it be a profession within
the meaning of Article 19(1)(g) Trade or
business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. Education has never been commerce in this
country."
29. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board
vs. A. Rajappa and Others [(1978) 2 SCC 213], wherein it had been held
that educational institutions would come within the expression
"industry" in the Industrial Disputes Act, and that, therefore,
education would come under Article 19(1)(g). But the applicability of this
decision was distinguished by Jeevan Reddy, J., observing that "we do not
think the said observation (that education as industry) in a different context
has any application here". While
holding, on an interpretation of Articles 21, 41, 45 and 46, that a citizen who
had not completed the age of 14 years had a right to free education, it was
held that such a right was not available to citizens who were beyond the age of
14 years. It was further held that
private educational institutions merely supplemented the effort of the state in
educating the people. No private educational
institution could survive or subsist without recognition and/or affiliation
granted by bodies that were the authorities of the state. In such a situation, the Court held that it
was obligatory upon the authority granting recognition/affiliation to insist
upon such conditions as were appropriate to ensure not only an education of
requisite standard, but also fairness and equal treatment in matters of
admission of students. The Court then formulated a scheme and directed every
authority granting recognition/affiliation to impose that scheme upon institutions
seeking recognition/affiliation, even if they were unaided institutions. The
scheme that was framed, inter alia, postulated (a) that a professional college should
be established and/or administered only by a Society registered under the
Societies Registration
Act, 1860, or the corresponding Act of a State, or by a
Public Trust registered
under the Trusts` Act, or under the Wakfs Act, and that no individual, firm,
company or other body of individuals would be permitted to establish and/or
administer a professional college (b) that 50% of the seats in every professional
college should be filled by the nominees of the Government or University,
selected on the basis of merit determined by a common entrance examination,
which will be referred to as "free seats"; the remaining 50% seats ("payment seats") should be
filled by those candidates who pay the fee prescribed therefor, and the
allotment of students against payment seats should be done on the basis of
inter se merit determined on the same basis as in the case of free seats (c) that
there should be no quota reserved for the management or for any family, caste or
community, which may have established such a college (d) that it should be open to the professional
college to provide for reservation of seats for constitutionally
permissible classes with the approval of the affiliating university (e) that
the fee chargeable in each professional college should be subject to such a ceiling
as may be prescribed by the appropriate authority or by a competent court (f)
that every state government should constitute a committee to fix the ceiling on
the fees chargeable by a professional college or class of professional
colleges, as the case may be. This
committee should, after hearing the professional colleges, fix the fee once
every three years or at such longer intervals, as it may think appropriate (g)
that it would be appropriate for the University Grants Commission to frame
regulations under its Act regulating the fees that the affiliated colleges operating
on a no grant-in-aid basis were entitled to charge. The AICTE, the Indian Medical Council and the
Central Government were also given similar advice. The manner in which the seats were to be filled on the
basis of the common entrance test was also indicated.
30. The counsel for the minority institutions, as well
as the Solicitor eneral, have contended
that the scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan's case was not warranted. It was represented to us that the cost
incurred on educating a student in an unaided professional college was more
than the total fee, which is realized on the basis of the formula fixed in the
scheme. This had resulted in revenue
shortfalls. This Court, by interim orders
subsequent to the decision in Unni Krishnan's case, had permitted, within the
payment seats, some percentage of seats to be allotted to Non-Resident Indians,
against payment of a higher amount as determined by the authorities. Even thereafter, sufficient funds were not available
for the development of those educational institutions. Another infirmity which was pointed out was
that experience has shown that most of the "free seats" were
generally occupied by students from affluent families, while students from less
affluent families were required to pay much more to secure admission to "payment
seats". This was for the reason
that students from affluent families had
had better school
education and the benefit of professional coaching facilities and were,
therefore, able to secure higher merit positions in the common entrance test, and
thereby secured the free seats. The
education of these more affluent students was in a way being cross-subsidized
by the financially poorer students who, because of their lower position in the
merit list, could secure only "payment seats". It was also submitted
by the counsel for the minority institutions that Unni Krishnan's case was not
applicable to the minority institutions, but that notwithstanding this, the
scheme so evolved had been made applicable to them as well.
31. Counsel for the institutions, as well as the
Solicitor General, submitted that the decision in Unni Krishnan's case, insofar
as it had framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission and the fixing
of the fee, was unreasonable and invalid.
However, its conclusion that children below the age of 14 had a fundamental
right to free education did not call for any interference.
32. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for
the parties that the implementation of the scheme by the States, which have
amended their rules and regulations, has shown a number of anomalies. As already noticed, 50% of the seats are to
be given on the basis of merit determined after the conduct of a common
entrance test, the rate of fee being minimal.
The "payment seats" which represent the balance number,
therefore, cross-subsidize the "free seats". The experience of the educational
institutions has been that students who come from private schools, and who
belong to more affluent families, are able to secure higher positions in the
merit list of the common entrance test, and are thus able to seek admission to
the "free seats". Paradoxically,
it is the students who come from less affluent families, who are normally able
to secure, on the basis of the merit list prepared after the common entrance
test, only "payment seats".
33. It was contended by petitioners' counsel that the
implementation of the Unni Krishnan scheme has in fact (1) helped the
privileged from richer urban families, even after they ceased to be
comparatively meritorious, and (2) resulted in economic losses for the
educational institutions concerned, and made them financially unviable. Data in support of this contention was placed
on record in an effort to persuade this Court to hold that the scheme had
failed to achieve its object.
34. Material has also been placed on the record in an
effort to show that the total fee realized from the fee fixed for "free
seats" and the "payment seats" is actually less than the amount
of expense that is incurred on each student admitted to the professional
college. It is because there was a
revenue shortfall that this Court had permitted an NRI quota to be carved out
of the 50% payment seats for which charging higher fee was permitted. Directions were given to UGC, AICTE, Medical
Council of India and Central and State governments to regulate or fix a ceiling
on fees, and to enforce the same by imposing conditions of affiliation/permission
to establish and run the institutions.
35. It appears to us that the scheme framed by this
Court and thereafter followed by the governments was one that cannot be called
a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Normally, the
reason for establishing an educational institution is to impart education. The institution thus needs qualified and
experienced teachers and proper facilities and equipment, all of which require capital
investment. The teachers are required to
be paid properly. As pointed out above, the
restrictions imposed by the scheme, in Unni Krishnan's case, made it difficult,
if not impossible, for the educational institutions to run efficiently. Thus, such restrictions cannot be said to be
reasonable restrictions.
36. The private unaided educational institutions impart
education, and that cannot be the reason to take away their choice in matters,
inter alia, of selection of students and fixation of fees. Affiliation and recognition has to
be available to every institution that fulfills the conditions for grant of
such affiliation and recognition. The
private institutions are right in submitting that it is not open to the Court
to insist that statutory authorities should impose the terms of the scheme as a
condition for grant of affiliation or recognition; this completely destroys the
institutional autonomy and the very objective of establishment of the
institution.
37. The Unni Krishnan judgment has created certain
problems, and raised thorny issues. In
its anxiety to check the commercialization of education, a scheme of
"free" and "payment" seats was evolved on the assumption
that the economic capacity of the first 50% of admitted students would be
greater than the remaining 50%, whereas the converse has proved to be the reality. In this scheme, the "payment seat"
student would not only pay for his own seat, but also finance the cost of a
"free seat" classmate. When one considers the Constitution Bench's earlier
statement that higher education is not a fundamental right, it seems unreasonable
to compel a citizen to pay for the education of another, more so in the
unrealistic world of competitive examinations which assess the merit for the
purpose of admission solely on the basis of the marks obtained, where the urban
students always have an edge over the rural students. In practice, it has been the case of the
marginally less merited rural or poor student bearing the burden of a rich and
well-exposed urban student.
38. The scheme in Unni Krishnan's case has the effect
of nationalizing education in respect of
important features, viz., the right of a private unaided institution to give
admission and to fix the fee. By framing
this scheme, which has led to the State Governments legislating in conformity
with the scheme, the private institutions are indistinguishable from the
government institutions; curtailing all the essential features of the right of
administration of a private unaided educational institution can neither be
called fair or reasonable. Even in the
decision in Unni Krishnan's case, it has been observed by Jeevan Reddy, J., at
page 749, para 194, as follows:
"The hard reality that emerges is that private
educational institutions are a necessity in the present day context. It is not possible to do without them because
the Governments are in no position to meet the demand - particularly in the
sector of medical and technical education which call for substantial
outlays. While education is one of the
most important functions of the Indian State it has no monopoly therein. Private educational institutions – including minority
educational institutions - too have a role to play."
39. That private educational institutions are a
necessity becomes evident from the fact that the number of
government-maintained professional colleges has more or less remained
stationary, while more private institutions have been established. For example, in the State of Karnataka there
are 19 medical colleges out of which there are only 4 government-maintained
medical colleges. Similarly, out of 14
Dental Colleges in Karnataka, only one has been established by the government,
while in the same State, out of 51 Engineering Colleges, only 12 have been
established by the government. The
aforesaid figures clearly indicate the important role played by private unaided
educational institutions, both minority and non-minority, which cater to the
needs of students seeking professional education.
40. Any system of student selection would be
unreasonable if it deprives the private unaided institution of the right of rational
selection, which it devised for itself, subject to the minimum qualification
that may be prescribed and to some system of computing the equivalence between
different kinds of qualifications, like a common entrance test. Such a system of selection can
involve both written and oral tests for selection, based on principle of
fairness.
41. Surrendering
the total process of selection to the state is unreasonable, as was sought
to be done in the Unni Krishnan scheme.
Apart from the decision in St. Stephen's College vs. University of Delhi
[(1992) 1 SCC 558], which recognized and upheld the right of a minority aided
institution to have a rational admission procedure of its own, earlier
Constitution Bench decisions of this Court have, in effect, upheld such a right
of an institution devising a rational manner of selecting and admitting
students.
42. In R. Chitralekha&Anr. vs. State of Mysore
&Ors. [(1964) 6 SCR
368], while considering
the validity of a viva-voce test for admission to a
government medical
college, it was observed at page 380 that colleges run by the government,
having regard to financial commitments and other relevant
considerations, would only
admit a specific number of students. It had devised a method for screening the
applicants for admission. While
upholding the order so issued, it was observed that "once it is conceded,
and it is not disputed before us, that the State Government can run medical and
engineering colleges, it cannot be denied the power to admit such qualified
students as pass the reasonable tests laid down by it. This is a power which every private owner of
a College will have, and the Government which runs its own Colleges cannot be
denied that power". (emphasis added)
43. Again, in Minor P. Rajendran vs. State of Madras
&Ors. [(1968) 2 SCR 786], it was observed
at page 795 that "so far as admission is concerned, it has to be made by those
who are in control of the Colleges, and in this case the Government, because the
medical colleges are Government colleges affiliated to the University. In these circumstances, the
Government was entitled to frame rules for admission to medical colleges
controlled by it subject to the rules of the university as to eligibility and
qualifications." The aforesaid
observations clearly underscore the right of the colleges to frame rules for
admission and to admit students. The
only requirement or control is that the rules for admission must be subject to
the rules of the university as to eligibility and qualifications. The Court did not say that the university
could provide the manner in which the students were to be selected.
44 In Kumari Chitra Ghosh and Another vs. Union of India and
Others
[(1969) 2 SCC 228],
dealing with a government run medical college at pages 232- 33, para 9, it was
observed as follows:
"It is the Central
Government which bears the financial burden of running the medical
college. It is for it to lay down the
criteria for eligibility..."
45. In
view of the discussion hereinabove, we hold that the decision in Unni
Krishnan's case, insofar as it framed the scheme relating to the grant of admission
and the fixing of the fee, was not correct, and to that extent, the said decision
and the consequent directions given to UGC, AICTE, Medical Council of India,
Central and State governments, etc., are overruled.
3. IN
CASE OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, CAN THERE BE
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AND, IF SO, TO WHAT
EXTENT?
46. We will now examine the nature and extent of the
regulations that can be framed by the State, University or any affiliating
body, while granting recognition or affiliation to a private educational
institution.
47. Private educational institutions, both aided and
unaided, are established and
administered by religious and linguistic minorities, as well as by non-minorities. Such private educational
institutions provide education at three levels, viz., school, college and
professional level. It is appropriate to
first deal with the case of private unaided institutions and private aided
institutions that are not administered by linguistic or religious minorities.
Regulations that can be framed relating to minority institutions will be
considered while examining the merit and effect of Article 30 of the
Constitution.
Private Unaided Non-Minority Educational
Institutions
48. Private education is one of the most dynamic and
fastest growing segments of post-secondary
education at the turn of the twenty-first century. A combination of unprecedented demand for
access to higher education and the inability or unwillingness of government to
provide the necessary support has brought private higher education to the
forefront. Private institutions, with a
long history in many countries, are expanding in scope and number, and are
becoming increasingly important in parts of the world that relied almost
entirely on the public sector.
49. Not only has demand overwhelmed the ability of the
governments to provide education, there has also been a significant change in
the way that higher education is perceived. The idea of an academic degree as a "private good" that benefits the
individual rather than a "public good" for society is now widely accepted. The logic of today's economics and an
ideology of privatization have contributed to the resurgence of private higher
education, and the establishing of private institutions where none or very few
existed before.
50. The
right to establish and administer broadly comprises of the
following rights:-
(a) to admit students:
(b) to set up a reasonable fee structure:
(c) to constitute a governing body;
(d) to appoint staff (teaching and
non-teaching); and
(e) to take action if there is dereliction of
duty on the part of any
Employees.
51. A University Education Commission was appointed on
4th November, 1948, having Dr. S. Radhakrishanan as its Chairman and nine other
renowned educationists as its members.
The terms of reference, inter alia, included matters relating to means
and objects of university education and research in India and maintenance of
higher standards of teaching and examination in universities and colleges under
their control. In the report submitted
by this Commission, in paras 29 and 31, it referred to autonomy in education
which reads as follows:-
"University
Autonomy. Freedom of individual development
is the basis of democracy. Exclusive control of education by the State
has been an important factor
in facilitating the maintenance of totalitarian tyrannies. In such States institutions of higher
learning controlled and managed by governmental
agencies act like mercenaries, promote the political purposes of the
State, make them acceptable to an increasing number of their
populations and supply them with the weapons they need. We must resist, in the interests of our own
democracy, the trendtowards the governmental
domination of the educational process.
Higher education is, undoubtedly, an obligation of the
State but State aid
is not to be confused with State control over academic policies and practices. Intellectual progress demands the maintenance of
the spirit of free inquiry. The pursuit and practice of truth regardless of
consequences has been the ambition of universities. Their prayer is that of the
dying Goethe: "More light." or that of Ajax in the mist "Light,
though I perish in the light.
Xxxxx xxx xxx
The respect in which the
universities of Great Britain are held is due to the freedom from
governmental interference which they enjoy constitutionally and
actually. Our universities should be
released from the control of
politics. Liberal Education. All
education is expected to be liberal. It
should free us from the shackles of ignorance, prejudice and unfounded belief. If we are incapable of achieving the
good life, it is due to faults in our inward
being, to the darkness in us. The
process of education is the slow
conquering of this darkness. To lead us
from darkness to light, to free
us from every kind of domination except that of reason, is the aim of
edu cation."
52. There cannot be a better exposition than what has
been observed by these renowned educationists with regard to autonomy in
education. The aforesaid passage clearly
shows that the governmental domination of the educational process must be
resisted. Another pithy observation of
the Commission was that state aid was not to be confused with state control
over academic policies and practices. The observations referred to hereinabove
clearly contemplate educational institutions soaring to great heights in
pursuit of intellectual excellence and being free from unnecessary governmental
controls.
53. With regard to the core components of the rights
under Articles 19 and 26(a), it must be held that while the state has the right
to prescribe qualifications necessary
for admission, private unaided colleges have the right to admit students of
their choice, subject to an objective and rational procedure of selection and
the compliance of conditions, if any, requiring admission of a small percentage
of students belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting them freeships
or scholarships, if not granted by the Government. Furthermore, in setting up a reasonable fee
structure, the element of profiteering is not as yet accepted in Indian
conditions. The fee structure must
take into consideration the need to generate funds to be utilized for the
betterment and growth of the educational institution, the betterment of
education in that institution and to provide facilities necessary for the
benefit of the students. In any event, a
private institution will have the right to constitute its own governing body,
for which qualifications may be prescribed by the state or the concerned
university. It will, however, be
objectionable if the state retains the power to nominate specific individuals
on governing bodies. Nomination by the state, which could be on a political
basis, will be an inhibiting factor for private enterprise to embark upon the occupation of establishing
and administering educational institutions. For
the same reasons, nomination of teachers either directly by the department or
through a service commission will be an unreasonable inroad and an unreasonable
restriction on the autonomy of the private unaided educational institution.
54. The
right to establish an educational institution can be regulated; but such
regulatory measures must, in general, be to ensure the maintenance of proper academic
standards, atmosphere and infrastructure (including qualified staff) and the
prevention of mal-administration by those in charge of management. The fixing
of a rigid fee structure, dictating the formation and composition of a governing
body, compulsory nomination of teachers and staff for appointment or nominating
students for admissions would be unacceptable restrictions.
55. The Constitution recognizes the right of the
individual or religious denomination, or a
religious or linguistic minority to establish an educational institution. If aid or financial assistance is not sought,
then such institution will be a private unaided institution. Although, in Unni
Krishnan's case, the Court emphasized the important
role played by private unaided institutions and the need for private funding,
in the scheme that was framed, restrictions were placed on some of the
important ingredients relating to the functioning of an educational institution. There can be no doubt that in seeking
affiliation or recognition, the Board or the university or the affiliating or
recognizing authority can lay down conditions consistent with the requirement
to ensure the excellence of education. It
can, for instance, indicate the quality of the teachers by prescribing the
minimum qualifications that they must possess, and the courses of study and
curricula. It can, for the same reasons, also stipulate the existence of
infrastructure sufficient for its growth, as a pre-requisite. But the essence of a private educational institution
is the autonomy that the institution must have in its management and administration. There, necessarily, has to be a
difference in the administration of private unaided institutions and the
government-aided institutions. Whereas
in the latter case, the Government will have greater say in the administration,
including admissions and fixing of
fees, in the case of private unaided institutions, maximum autonomy in the day-to-day
administration has to be with the private unaided institutions. Bureaucratic or governmental interference in
the administration of such an institution will undermine its independence. While an educational institution is not a
business, in order to examine the degree of independence that can be given to a
recognized educational institution, like any private entity that does not seek
aid or assistance from the Government, and that exists by virtue of the funds
generated by it, including its loans or borrowings, it is important to note that
the essential ingredients of the management of the private institution include the
recruiting students and staff, and the quantum of fee that is to be charged.
56. An educational institution is established for the
purpose of imparting education of the type made available by the
institution. Different courses of study are
usually taught by teachers who have to be recruited as per qualifications that may
be prescribed. It is no secret that
better working conditions will attract better teachers. More amenities will ensure that better
students seek admission to that institution.
One cannot lose sight of the fact that providing good amenities to the students
in the form of competent teaching faculty and other infrastructure costs money. It has, therefore, to be left to the
institution, if it chooses not to seek any aid from the government, to
determine the scale of fee that it can charge from the students. One also cannot lose sight of the fact that
we live in a competitive world today, where professional education is in
demand. We have been given to understand
that a large number of professional and other institutions have been started by
private parties who do not seek any governmental aid. In a sense, a prospective student has
various options open to him/her where, therefore, normally economic forces have
a role to play. The decision on the fee to be charged must necessarily be left to the
private educational institution that does not seek or is not dependent upon any
funds from the government.
57. We, however, wish to emphasize one point, and that
is that inasmuch as the occupation of education is, in a sense, regarded as
charitable, the government can provide regulations that will ensure excellence
in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering
by the institution. Since the object of setting up an educational institution
is by definition "charitable", it is clear that an educational
institution cannot charge such a fee as is not required for the purpose of
fulfilling that object. To put it
differently, in the establishment of an educational institution, the object
should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable
in nature. There can, however, be a
reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational
institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the
institution.
58. For admission into any professional institution,
merit must play an important role. While it may not be normally possible to
judge the merit of the applicant who seeks admission into a school, while
seeking admission to a professional institution
and to become a competent professional, it is necessary that meritorious
candidates are not unfairly treated or put at a disadvantage by preferences
shown to less meritorious but more influential applicants. Excellence in professional education would
require that greater emphasis be laid on the merit of a student seeking
admission. Appropriate regulations for
this purpose may be made keeping in view the other observations made in this
judgment in the context of admissions to unaided institutions.
59. Merit is usually determined, for admission to
professional and highereducation colleges, by either the marks that the student
obtains at the qualifyingexamination or school leaving certificate stage
followed by the interview, or by acommon entrance test conducted by the
institution, or in the case of professional colleges, by government agencies.
60. Education is taught at different levels from
primary to professional. Itis,
therefore, obvious that government regulations for all levels or types
ofeducational institutions cannot be identical; so also, the extent of control
orregulation could be greater vis-a-vis aided institutions.
61. In the case of unaided private schools, maximum
autonomy has to bewith the management with regard to administration, including
the right of appointment, disciplinary
powers, admission of students and the fees to be charged. At the school level, it is not possible to
grant admissions on the basis ofmerit. It
is no secret that the examination results at all levels of unaided
privateschools, notwithstanding the stringent regulations of the governmental
authorities, are far superior to the results of the government-maintained
schools. There is no compulsion on
students to attend private schools. The
rush for admission is occasioned by the standards maintained in such schools,
and recognition of the fact that state-run schools do not provide the same
standards of education. The State says that it has no funds to establish
institutions at the same level of excellence as private schools. But by curtailing the income of such private
schools, it disables those schools from affording the best facilities because
of a lack of funds. If this lowering of
standards from excellence to a level of mediocrity is to be avoided, the state
has to provide the difference which, therefore, brings us back in a vicious circle
to the original problem, viz., the lack of state funds. The solution would appear to lie in the States not using their
scanty resources to prop up institutions that are able to otherwise maintain
themselves out of the fees charged, but in improving the facilities and infrastructure
of state-run schools and in subsidizing the fees payable by the students there. It is in the interest of the general
public that more good quality schools
are established; autonomy and non-regulation of the school administration in
the right of appointment, admission of the students and the fee to be charged
will ensure that more such institutions are established. The fear that if a private school is allowed
to charge fees commensurate with the fees affordable, the degrees would be
"purchasable" is an unfounded one since the standards of education
can be and are controllable through the regulations relating to recognition,
affiliation and common final examinations.
62. There is a need for private enterprise in
non-professional college
education as well. At present, insufficient number of
undergraduate colleges are being and have been established, one of the
inhibiting factors being that there is a lack of autonomy due to government
regulations. It will not be wrong to
presume that the numbers of professional colleges are growing at a faster rate
than the number of undergraduate and non-professional colleges. While it is desirable that there should
be a sufficient number of professional colleges, it should also be possible for
private unaided undergraduate colleges that are non-technical in nature to have
maximum autonomy similar to a school.
63. It was submitted that for maintaining the
excellence of education, it was important that the teaching faculty and the
members of the staff of any educational institution
performed their duties in the manner in which it is required to be done,
according to the rules or instructions.
There have been cases of misconduct having been committed by the
teachers and other members of the staff. The grievance of the institution is
that whenever disciplinary action is sought to be taken in relation to such
misconduct, the rules that are normally framed by the government or the
university are clearly loaded against the Management. It was submitted that in some cases, the rules require the
prior permission of the governmental authorities before the initiation of the
disciplinary proceeding, while in other cases, subsequent permission is
required before the imposition of penalties in the case of proven misconduct. While emphasizing the need for an independent authority
to adjudicate upon the grievance of the employee or the Management in the event of some
punishment being imposed, it was submitted that there should be no role for the
government or the university to play in relation to the imposition of any
penalty on the employee.
64. An educational institution is established only for
the purpose of imparting education to the
students. In such an institution, it is necessary for all to maintain
discipline and abide by the rules and regulations that have been lawfully framed.
The teachers are like foster-parents who are required to look after, cultivate
and guide the students in their pursuit of education. The teachers and the institution exist for the students
and not vice versa. Once this
principle is kept in mind, it must follow that it becomes imperative for the
teaching and other staff of an educational institution to perform their duties
properly, and for the benefit of the students.
Where allegations of misconduct are made, it is imperative that a disciplinary
enquiry is conducted, and that a decision is taken. In the case of a private institution, the
relationship between the Management and the employees is contractual in nature. A teacher, if the contract so
provides, can be proceeded against, and appropriate disciplinary action can be
taken if the misconduct of the teacher is proved. Considering the nature of the duties and
keeping the principle of natural justice in mind for the purposes of
establishing misconduct and taking action thereon, it is imperative that a fair
domestic enquiry is conducted. It is
only on the basis of the result of the disciplinary enquiry that the management
will be entitled to take appropriate action.
We see no reason why the Management of a private unaided educational
institution should seek the consent or approval of any governmental authority
before taking any such action. In the
ordinary relationship of master and servant, governed by the terms of a
contract of employment, anyone who is guilty of breach of the terms can be
proceeded against and appropriate relief can be sought. Normally, the aggrieved party would approach a court of law and seek
redress. In the case of educational
institutions, however, we are of the opinion that requiring a teacher or a
member of the staff to go to a civil court for the purpose of seeking redress
is not in the interest of general education.
Disputes between the management and
the staff of educational institutions must be decided speedily, and without the
excessive incurring of costs. It
would, therefore, be appropriate that an educational Tribunal be set up in each
district in a State, to enable the aggrieved teacher to file an appeal, unless
there already exists such an educational tribunal in a State the object being
that the teacher should not suffer through the substantial costs that arise
because of the location of the tribunal; if the tribunals are limited in
number, they can hold circuit/camp sittings in different districts to achieve
this objective. Till a specialized
tribunal is set up, the right of filing the appeal would lie before the
District Judge or Additional District Judge as notified by the government. It will not be necessary for the institution
to get prior permission or ex post
facto approval of a governmental authority while taking disciplinary action
against a teacher or any other employee.
The State government shall
determine, in consultation with the High Court, the judicial forum in which an aggrieved
teacher can file an appeal against the decision of the Management concerning
disciplinary action or termination of service.
65. The reputation of an educational institution is
established by the quality of its faculty and
students, and the educational and other facilities that the college has to
offer. The private educational
institutions have a personality of their own, and in order to maintain their
atmosphere and traditions, it is but necessary that they must have the right to
choose and select the students who can be admitted to their courses of
studies. It is for this reason that in
the St. Stephen's College case, this Court upheld the scheme whereby a cut-off
percentage was fixed for admission, after which the students were interviewed
and thereafter selected. While an educational institution cannot grant
admission on its whims and fancies, and must follow some identifiable or
reasonable methodology of admitting the students, any scheme, rule or
regulation that does not give the institution the right to reject candidates
who might otherwise be qualified according to, say, their performance in an
entrance test, would be an unreasonable restriction under Article 19(6), though
appropriate guidelines/modalities can be prescribed for holding the entrance test in a fair
manner. Even when students are required
to be selected on the basis of merit, the ultimate decision to grant admission
to the students who have otherwise qualified for the grant of admission must be
left with the educational institution concerned. However, when the institution
rejects such students, such rejection must not be whimsical or for extraneous
reasons.
66. In the case of private unaided educational
institutions, the authority granting recognition or affiliation can certainly
lay down conditions for the grant of recognition or affiliation; these
conditions must pertain broadly to academic and educational matters and welfare
of students and teachers but how the
private unaided institutions are to run is a matter of administration to be taken
care of by the Management of those institutions. Private
Unaided Professional Colleges
67. We
now come to the regulations that can be framed relating to private unaided
professional institutions.
68. It would be unfair to apply the same rules and
regulations regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional
institutions. It must be borne in mind
that unaided professional institutions are entitled to autonomy in their administration
while, at the same time, they do not forgo or discard the principle of merit. It would, therefore, be permissible
for the university or the government, at the time of granting recognition, to
require a private unaided institution to provide for merit-based selection
while, at the same time, giving the Management sufficient discretion in
admitting students. This can be done
through various methods. For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can be
reserved for admission by the Management out of those students who have passed
the common entrance test held by itself or by the State/University and have
applied to the college concerned for admission, while the rest of the seats may
be filled up on the basis of counselling by the state agency. This will incidentally take care of poorer and
backward sections of the society. The
prescription of percentage for this purpose has to be done by the government
according to the local needs and different percentages can be fixed for
minority unaided and non-minority unaided and professional colleges. The same
principles may be applied to other non-professional but unaided educational
institutions viz., graduation and post graduation non-professional colleges or
institutes.
69. In such professional unaided institutions, the
Management will have the right to select teachers as per the qualifications and
eligibility conditions laid down by the State/University subject to adoption of
a rational procedure of selection. A
rational fee structure should be adopted by the Management, which would not be
entitled to charge a capitation fee. Appropriate machinery can be devised by
the state or university to ensure that no capitation fee is charged and that
there is no profiteering, though a reasonable surplus for the furtherance of education
is permissible. Conditions granting
recognition or affiliation can broadly cover academic and educational matters
including the welfare of students and teachers.
70. It is well established all over the world that
those who seek professional education
must pay for it. The number of seats available in government and
government-aided colleges is very small, compared to the number of persons
seeking admission to the medical and engineering colleges. All those eligible and deserving candidates
who could not be accommodated in government
colleges would stand deprived of professional education. This void in the field of medical and
technical education has been filled by institutions that are established in
different places with the aid of donations and the active part taken by public-minded
individuals. The object of establishing
an institution has thus been to provide technical or professional education to
the deserving candidates, and is not necessarily a commercial venture. In order that this intention is meaningful,
the institution must be recognized.
At the school level, the recognition or affiliation has to be sought from the
educational authority or the body that conducts the school-leaving examination.
It is only on the basis of that examination that a school-leaving certificate
is granted, which enables a student to seek admission in further courses of
study after school. A college or a professional educational institution has to get
recognition from the concerned university, which normally requires certain
conditions to be fulfilled before recognition.
It has been held that conditions of affiliation or recognition, which pertain
to the academic and educational character of the institution and ensure
uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses are valid, and
that they do not violate even the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution;
but conditions that are laid down for granting recognition should not be such
as may lead to governmental control of the administration of the private
educational institutions.
Private Aided Professional Institutions (non-minority)
71. While giving aid to professional institutions, it
would be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by rules or
regulations, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be granted to
different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation
policy of the state. The merit may be determined
either through a common entrance test conducted by the University or the
Government followed by counselling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted
by individual institutions the method to
be followed is for the university or the government to decide. The authority
may also devise other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided
professional institution on the basis of merit.
In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the
government or the university to provide that consideration should be shown to
the weaker sections of the society.
72. Once aid is granted to a private professional educational
institution, the government or the state agency, as a condition of the grant of
aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and
management of the institution. The
state, which gives aid to an educational institution, can impose such
conditions as are necessary for the proper maintenance of the high standards of
education as the financial burden is shared by the state. The state would also be under an obligation
to protect the interest of the teaching and non-teaching staff. In many states,
there are various statutory provisions to regulate the functioning of such
educational institutions where the States give, as a grant or aid, a
substantial proportion of the revenue expenditure including salary, pay and
allowances of teaching and non-teaching staff.
It would be its responsibility to ensure that the teachers working in
those institutions are governed by proper service conditions.
The state, in the case of
such aided institutions, has ample power to regulate the method of selection
and appointment of teachers after prescribing requisite qualifications for the
same. Ever since In Re The Kerala
Education Bill, 1957 [(1959) SCR 995], this Court has upheld, in the case of
aided institutions, those regulations that served the interests of students and
teachers. Checks on the administration
may be necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and
sound and will serve the academic needs of the institutions. In other words, rules and regulations that
promote good administration and prevent mal-administration can be formulated so
as to promote the efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in
administration and to preserve harmony among affiliated institutions. At the same time it has to be ensured that even
an aided institution does not become a government-owned and controlled
institution. Normally, the aid
that is granted is relatable to the pay and allowances of the teaching
staff. In addition, the Management of
the private aided institutions has to incur revenue and
capital expenses. Such aided institutions cannot obtain that
extent of autonomy in relation to management and administration as would be
available to a private unaided institution, but at the same time, it cannot
also be treated as an educational institution departmentally run by government
or as a wholly owned and controlled government institution and interfere with
Constitution of the governing bodies or thrusting the staff without reference
to Management.
Other Aided Institutions
73. There are a large number of educational
institutions, like schools and non-professional colleges, which cannot operate
without the support of aid from the state.
Although these institutions may have been established by philanthropists
or other public-spirited persons, it becomes necessary, in order to provide inexpensive
education to the students, to seek aid from the state. In such cases, as those of the professional
aided institutions referred to hereinabove, the Government would be entitled to
make regulations relating to the terms and conditions of employment of the
teaching and non-teaching staff whenever the aid for the posts is given by the
State as well as admission procedures.
Such rules and regulations can also provide for the reasons and the
manner in which a teacher or any other member of the staff can be removed. In other words, the autonomy of a private
aided institution would be less than that of an unaided institution.
4. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF A RELIGIOUS
OR LINGUISTIC MINORITY IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 30,
WHAT IS TO BE THE UNIT -
THE STATE OR THE COUNTRY AS
A WHOLE?
74. We now consider the question of the unit for the
purpose of determining the definition
of "minority" within the meaning of Article 30(1).
75. Article 30(1) deals with religious minorities and
linguistic minorities. The opening words of Article 30(1) make it clear that
religious and linguistic minorities have been put at par, insofar as that
Article is concerned. Therefore, whatever
the unit - whether a state or the whole of India - for determining a linguistic
minority, it would be the same in relation to a religious minority. India is divided into different
linguistic states. The states have been
carved out on the basis of the language of the majority of persons of that
region. For example, Andhra Pradesh was
established on the basis of the language of that region, viz., Telugu. "Linguistic
minority" can, therefore, logically only be in relation to a particular State.
If the determination of "linguistic minority" for the purpose of
Article 30 is to be in relation to the whole of India, then within the State of
Andhra Pradesh, Telugu speakers will have to be regarded as a "linguistic
minority". This will clearly be
contrary to the concept of linguistic states.
76. If, therefore, the state has to be regarded as the
unit for determining "linguistic minority" vis--vis Article 30, then
with "religious minority" being on the same footing, it is the state
in relation to which the majority or minority status will have to be
determined.
77. In the Kerala Education Bill case, the question as
to whether the
minority community was to
be determined on the basis of the entire population of India, or on the basis
of the population of the State forming a part of the Union was posed at page
1047. It had been contended by the State
of Kerala that for claiming the status of minority, the persons must
numerically be a minority in the particular region in which the educational
institution was situated, and that the locality or ward or town where the
institution was to be situated had to be taken as the unit to determine the
minority community. No final opinion on
this question was expressed, but it was observed at page 1050 that as the
Kerala Education Bill "extends to the whole of the State of Kerala and
consequently the minority must be determined by reference to the entire
population of that State."
78. In two cases pertaining to the DAV College, this
Court had to consider whether the
Hindus were a religious minority in the State of Punjab. In D.A.V. College vs. State of Punjab
&Ors. [1971 (Supp.) SCR 688], the question posed was as to what
constituted a religious or linguistic minority, and how it was to be determined. After examining the opinion of this Court in the
Kerala Education Bill case, the
Court held that the AryaSamajis, who were Hindus, were a religious minority in
the State of Punjab, even though they may not have been so in relation to the
entire country. In another case, D.A.V.
College Bhatinda vs.State of Punjab &Ors. [1971
(Supp.) SCR 677], the observations in the first D.A.V. College case were
explained, and at page 681, it was stated that "what constitutes a
linguistic or religious minority must be judged in relation to the State inasmuch
as the impugned Act was a State Act and not in relation to the whole of India."
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that since Hindus were a majority in
India, they could not be a religious minority in the state of Punjab, as it took
the state as the unit to determine whether the Hindus were a minority community.
79. There can, therefore, be little doubt that this
Court has consistently held that, with regard to a state law, the unit to
determine a religious or linguistic minority can only be the state.
80. The Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution
included education in the Concurrent List under Entry 25. Would this in any way change the
position with regard to the determination of a "religious" or
"linguistic minority" for the purposes of Article 30?
81. As a result of the insertion of Entry 25 into List
III, Parliament can now legislate in relation
to education, which was only a state subject previously. The jurisdiction of
the Parliament is to make laws for the whole or a part of India. It is well
recognized that geographical classification is not violative of Article 14. It
would, therefore, be possible that, with respect to a particular State or group
of States, Parliament may legislate in
relation to education. However, Article
30 gives the right to a linguistic or religious minority of a State to
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The minority for the purpose of Article 30
cannot have different meanings depending upon who is legislating. Language
being the basis for the establishment of different states for the purposes of
Article 30, a "linguistic minority" will have to be determined in
relation to the state in which the educational institution is sought to be
established. The position with regard to
the religious minority is similar, since both religious and linguistic minorities
have been put at par in Article 30.
5. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE RIGHTS OF AIDED PRIVATE MINORITY INSTITUTIONS TO
ADMINISTER BE REGULATED?
82. Article 25 gives to all persons the freedom of
conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate
religion. This right, however, is not absolute. The opening words of Article 25(1) make this
right subject to public order, morality and health, and also to the other
provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
This would mean that the right given to a person under 25(1) can be curtailed
or regulated if the exercise of that right would violate other provisions of Part
III of the Constitution, or if the exercise thereof is not in consonance with public
order, morality and health. The general
law made by the government contains provisions relating to public order,
morality and health; these would have to be complied with, and cannot be
violated by any person in exercise of his freedom of conscience or his freedom
to profess, practice and propagate religion. For example, a person cannot
propagate his religion in such a manner as to denigrate another religion or
bring about dissatisfaction amongst people.
83. Article 25(2) gives specific power to the state to
make any law
regulating or restricting
any economic, financial, political or other secular activity, which may be
associated with religious practice as provided by sub-clause (a) of Article
25(2). This is a further curtailment of the right to profess, practice and propagate
religion conferred on the persons under Article 25(1). Article 25(2)(a) covers only a limited area
associated with religious practice, in respect of which a law can be made. A careful reading of Article 25(2)(a)
indicates that it does not prevent the State from making any law in relation to
the religious practice as such. The limited jurisdiction granted by Article
25(2) relates to the making of a law in relation to economic, financial,
political or other secular activities associated with the religious practice.
84. The freedom to manage religious affairs is provided
by Article 26. This Article gives the
right to every religious denomination, or any section thereof, to exercise the
rights that it stipulates. However, this
right has to be exercised in a manner that is in conformity with public order,
morality and health. Clause (a) of Article
26 gives a religious denomination the right to establish and maintain institutions
for religious and charitable purposes.
There is no dispute that the establishment of an educational institution
comes within the meaning of the expression "charitable purpose". Therefore, while Article 25(1) grants the
freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate
religion, Article 26 can be said to be complementary to it, and provides for
every religious denomination, or any section thereof, to exercise the rights
mentioned therein. This is because Article 26 does not deal with the right of
an individual, but is confined to a religious denomination. Article 26 refers to a denomination of any religion,
whether it is a majority or a minority religion, just as Article 25 refers to all
persons, whether they belong to the majority or a minority religion. Article 26 gives the right to majority
religious denominations, as well as to minority religious denominations, to
exercise the rights contained therein.
85. Secularism being one of the important basic
features of our Constitution, Article 27
provides that no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of
which are specifically appropriated for the payment of expenses for the promotion
and maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. The manner in which the Article has been framed
does not prohibit the state from enacting a law to incur expenses for the
promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination,
but specifies that by that law, no person can be compelled to pay any tax, the
proceeds of which are to be so utilized.
In other words, if there is a tax for the promotion or maintenance of
any particular religion or religious denomination, no person can be compelled
to pay any such tax.
86. Article 28(1) prohibits any educational
institution, which is wholly
maintained out of state
funds, to provide for religious instruction.
Moral education dissociated from any denominational doctrine is not
prohibited; but, as the state is intended to be secular, an educational
institution wholly maintained out of state funds cannot impart or provide for
any religious instruction.
87. The exception to Article 28(1) is contained in
Article 28(2). Article 28(2) deals with cases
where, by an endowment or trust, an institution is established, and the terms
of the endowment or the trust require the imparting of religious instruction,
and where that institution is administered by the state. In such a case, the prohibition contained in Article 28(1)
does not apply. If the administration
of such an institution is voluntarily given to the government, or the government,
for a good reason and in accordance with law, assumes or takes over the
management of that institution, say on account of mal-administration, then the government,
on assuming the administration of the institution, would be obliged to continue
with the imparting of religious instruction as provided by the endowment or the
trust.
88. While Article 28(1) and Article 28(2) relate to
institutions that are wholly maintained out of
state funds, Article 28(3) deals with an educational institution that is
recognized by the state or receives aid out of state funds. Article 28(3) gives the person attending any
educational institution the right not to take part in any religious
instruction, which may be imparted by an institution recognized by the state,
or receiving aid from the state. Such a
person also has the right not to attend any religious worship that may be
conducted in such an institution, or in any premises attached thereto, unless
such a person, or if he/she is a minor, his/her guardian, has given his/her
consent. The reading of Article 28(3) clearly
shows that no person attending an educational institution can be required to take
part in any religious instruction or any religious worship, unless the person
or his/her guardian has given his/her consent thereto, in a case where the
educational institution has been recognized by the state or receives aid out of
its funds. We have seen that Article
26(a) gives the religious denomination the right to establish an educational
institution, the religious denomination being either of the majority community
or minority community. In any institution, whether established by the majority
or a minority religion, if religious instruction is imparted, no student can be
compelled to take part in the said religious instruction or in any religious worship. An individual has the absolute right not to
be compelled to take part in any religious instruction or worship. Article 28(3) thereby recognizes the right of
an individual to practice or profess his own religion. In other words, in
matters relating to religious instruction or worship, there can be no
compulsion where the educational institution is either recognized by the state
or receives aid from the state.
89. Articles 29 and 30 are a group of articles relating
to cultural and educational rights. Article 29(1) gives the right to any section
of the citizens residing in India or any
part thereof, and having a distinct language, script or culture of its own, to
conserve the same. Article 29(1) does
not refer to any religion, even though the
marginal note of the Article mentions the interests of minorities. Article 29(1) essentially refers to sections
of citizens who have a distinct language, script
or culture, even though their religion may not be the same. The common thread
that runs through Article 29(1) is language, script or culture, and not
religion. For example, if in any part of
the country, there is a section of society that has a distinct language, they
are entitled to conserve the same, even though the persons having that language
may profess different religions. Article
29(1) gives the right to all sections of citizens, whether they are in a
minority or the majority religions, to conserve their language, script or
culture.
90. In the exercise of this right to conserve the
language, script or culture, that section of the society can set up educational
institutions. The right to establish and
maintain educational institutions of its choice is a necessary concomitant to
the right conferred by Article 30. The
right under Article 30 is not absolute.
Article 29(2) provides that, where any educational institution is
maintained by the state or receives aid out of state funds, no citizen shall be
denied admission on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any
of them. The use of the expression "any
educational institution" in Article 29(2) would refer to any educational institution
established by anyone, but which is maintained by the state or receives aid out of state funds. In other words, on a plain reading,
state-maintained or aided educational institutions, whether established by the
Government or the majority or a minority community cannot deny admission to a
citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste or language.
91. The right of the minorities to establish and
administer educational institutions is provided
for by Article 30(1). To some extent, Article 26(1)(a) and Article 30(1) overlap,
insofar as they relate to the establishment of educational institutions; but whereas
Article 26 gives the right both to the majority as well as minority communities to establish and maintain institutions for charitable purposes, which would,
inter alia, include educational institutions, Article 30(1) refers to the right
of minorities to establish and maintain educational institutions of their
choice. Another difference between Article 26 and Article 30 is that whereas
Article 26 refers only to religious denominations, Article 30 contains the
right of religious as well as linguistic minorities to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice.
92. Article 30(1) bestows on the minorities, whether
based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer
educational institution of their choice.
Unlike Articles 25 and 26, Article 30(1) does not specifically state that the right
under Article 30(1) is subject to public order, morality and health or to other
provisions of Part III This sub-Article
also does not specifically mention that the right to establish and administer a
minority educational institution would be subject to any rules or regulations.
93. Can Article 30(1) be so read as to mean that it
contains an absolute right of the minorities, whether based on religion or
language, to establish and administer educational institutions in any manner
they desire, and without being obliged to comply with the provisions of any
law? Does Article 30(1) give the religious or linguistic minorities a right to
establish an educational institution that propagates religious or racial
bigotry or ill will amongst the people? Can the right under Article 30(1) be so
exercised that it is opposed to public morality or health? In the exercise of
its right, would the minority while establishing educational institutions not
be bound by town planning rules and regulations? Can they construct and
maintain buildings in any manner they desire without complying with the
provisions of the building by-laws or health regulations?
94. In order to interpret Article 30 and its interplay,
if any, with Article 29, our attention was
drawn to the Constituent Assembly Debates. While referring to them, the learned
Solicitor General submitted that the provisions of Article 29(2) were intended
to be applicable to minority institutions seeking protection of Article 30. He argued that if any educational institution
sought aid, it could not deny admission only on the ground of religion, race,
caste or language and, consequently, giving a preference to the minority over
more meritorious non-minority students was impermissible. It is now necessary to refer to some of the decisions
of this Court insofar as they interpret Articles 29 and 30, and to examine whether
any creases therein need ironing out.
95. In The State of Madras vs.
Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan [(1951) SCR 525], the
State had issued an order, which provided that admission to students to
engineering and medical colleges in the State should be decided by the Selection
Committee, strictly on the basis of the number of seats fixed for different communities. While considering the validity of this order,
this Court interpreted Article 29(2) and held that if admission was refused
only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, then there
was a clear breach of the fundamental right under Article 29(2). The said order
was construed as being violative of Article 29(2), because students who did not
fall in the particular categories were to be denied admission. In this connection it was observed as follows:-
".so far as those
seats are concerned, the petitioners are denied admission into any of
them, not on any ground other than the sole ground of their being
Brahmins and not being members of the community for whom those
reservations were made..."
96. This government order was held to be violative of
the Constitution and constitutive of a
clear breach of Article 29(2). Article
30 did not come up for consideration in that case.
97. In The State of Bombay vs. Bombay Education Society
and Others [(1955) 1 SCR 568], the
State had issued a circular, the operative portion of which directed that no primary
or secondary school could, from the date of that circular admit to a class
where English was used as a medium of instruction, any pupil other than pupils
belonging to a section of citizens, the language of whom was English, viz.,
Anglo-Indians and citizens of non-Asiatic descent. The validity of the circular was challenged
while admission was refused, inter alia, to a member of the Gujarati Hindu
Community. A number of writ petitions
were filed and the High Court allowed them.
In an application filed by the State of Bombay, this Court had to
consider whether the said circular was ultra vires Article 29(2). In deciding
this question, the Court analyzed the provisions of Articles 29(2) and 30, and
repelled the contention that Article 29(2) guaranteed the right only to the citizens
of the minority group. It was observed,
in this connection, at page 579, as follows:
"The language of
Article 29(2) is wide and unqualified and may well cover all citizens whether
they belong to the majority or minority group.
Article 15 protects all citizens against the State whereas the protection of
Article 29(2) extends against the State or anybody who denies the right
conferred by it. Further Article 15 protects
all citizens against discrimination generally but Article 29(2) is a protection
against a particular species of wrong namely denial of admission into
educational institutions of the specified kind.
In the next place Article 15 is quite general and wide in its terms and
applies to all citizens, whether they belong to the majority or minority
groups, and gives protection to all the citizens against discrimination by the
State on certain specific grounds. Article 29(2) confers a special right on
citizens for admission into educational institutions maintained or aided by the
State. To limit this right only to citizens belonging to minority groups will
be to provide a double protection for such citizens and to hold that the citizens
of the majority group have no special educational rights in the nature of a
right to be admitted into an educational institution for the maintenance of
which they make contributions by way of taxes. We see no cogent reason for such
discrimination. The heading under which Articles 29 and 30 are grouped together
- namely "Cultural and Educational Rights"- is quite general and does
not in terms contemplate such differentiation.
If the fact that the institution is maintained or aided out of
State funds is the basis of this guaranteed right then all citizens,
irrespective of whether they belong to the majority or minority groups; are
alike entitled to the protection of this fundamental right."
98. It is clear from the aforesaid discussion that this
Court came to the conclusion that in the
case of minority educational institutions to which protection was available
under Article 30, the provisions of Article 29(2) were indeed applicable. But, it may be seen that the question in the present
form i.e., whether in the matter of admissions into aided minority educational
institutions, minority students could be preferred to a reasonable extent,
keeping in view the special protection given under Article 30(1), did not arise
for consideration in that case.
99. In the Kerala Education Bill case, this Court again
had the occasion to consider the interplay
of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. This case was a reference under
Article 143(1) of the Constitution made by the President of India to obtain the
opinion of this Court on certain questions relating to the constitutional validity
of some of the provisions of the Kerala Education Bill, 1957, which had been
passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly, but had been reserved by the Governor
for the consideration of the President. Clause 3(5) of the Bill, made the recognition
of new schools subject to the other provisions of the Bill and the rules framed
by the Government under clause (36); clause (15) authorized the Government to
acquire any category of schools; clause 8(3) made it obligatory on all aided
schools to hand over the fees to the Government; clauses 9 to 13 made provisions
for the regulation and management of the schools, payment of salaries to
teachers and the terms and conditions of their appointment, and clause (33) forbade
the granting of temporary injunctions and interim orders in restraint of proceedings
under the Act.
100. With reference to Article 29(2),
the Court observed at page 1055, while dealing with an
argument based on Article 337 that "likewise Article 29(2) provides, inter alia, that no citizen shall
be denied admission into any educational institution receiving aid out of State
funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them".
Referring to Part III of the Constitution and to Articles 19 and 25 to 28 in
particular, the Court said:-
"..Under Article 25
all persons are equally entitled, subject to public order, morality and health
and to the other provisions of Part III, to freedom of conscience and the right
freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Article 26 confers the fundamental right to every
religious denomination or any section thereof, subject to public order,
morality and health, to establish and maintain institutions for religious and
charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to
acquire property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The ideal being to constitute India into a
secular State, no religious instruction is, under Article 28(1), to be provided
in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds and under
clause (3) of the same Article no person attending any educational institution
recognized by the State or receiving aid out of State funds is to be required
to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution
or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or
in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a
minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto. Article 29(1) confers on any section of the
citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own to have the right
of conserving the same. Clause (2) of
that Article provides that no citizen shall be denied
admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving
aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or
any of them."
101. Dealing with Articles 29 and 30
at page 1046, it was observed as follows:- "Articles
29 and 30 are set out in Part III of our Constitution which guarantees our fundamental
rights. They are grouped together under the
sub-head "Cultural and Educational Rights".The text and the marginal
notes of both the Articles show that their purpose is to confer those
fundamental rights on certain sections of the community which constitute
minority communities. Under clause (1)
of Article 29 any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or
any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own has
the right to conserve the same. It
is obvious that a minority community can effectively conserve its language, script
or culture by and through educational institutions and, therefore, the right to
establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice is a necessary
concomitant to the right to conserve its distinctive language, script or
culture and that is what is conferred on all minorities by Article 30(1) which
has hereinbefore been quoted in full.
This right, however, is subject to clause 2 or Article 29 which provides
that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution
maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, language or any of them."
102. It had been, inter alia,
contended on behalf of the state that if a single member of any other community
is admitted in a school established for a particular minority community, then
the educational institution would cease to be an educational institution
established by that particular minority community. It was contended that because of Article
29(2), when an educational institution established by a minority community gets
aid, it would be precluded from denying admission to members of other
communities because of Article 29(2), and that as a consequence thereof, it
would cease to be an educational institution of the choice of the minority
community that established it. Repelling this argument, it was observed at
pages 1051-52, as follows:-
"This
argument does not appear to us to be warranted by the language of the Article
itself. There is no such limitation in
Article 30(1) and to accept this limitation will necessarily involve the addition
of the words "for their own community" in the Article which is
ordinarily not permissible according to well established rules of
interpretation. Nor is it reasonable to
assume that the purpose of Article 29(2)
was to deprive minority educational institutions of the aid they receive from
the State. To say that an institution
which receives aid on account of its being minority educational institution
must not refuse to admit any member of any other community only on the grounds
therein mentioned and then to say that as soon as such institution admits such
an outsider it will cease to be a minority institution is tantamount to saying
that minority
institutions will not, as minority institutions, be entitled to any aid. The real import of Article 29(2) and Article
30(1) seems to us to be that they clearly contemplate a minority institution
with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted into it. By admitting a non-member into it the
minority institution does not shed its character and cease to be a minority
institution. Indeed the object of conservation
of the distinct language, script and culture of a minority may be better served
by propagating the same amongst non-members of the particular minority
community. In our opinion, it
is not possible to read this condition into Article 30(1) of the Constitution."
103. It will be seen that the use of
the expression "sprinkling of outsiders" in that case clearly implied
the applicability of Article 29(2) to Article 30(1); the Court held that when a
minority educational institution received aid, outsiders would have to be
admitted. This part of the state's
contention was accepted, but what was rejected was the contention that by
taking outsiders, a minority institution would cease to be an educational
institution of the choice of the minority community that established it. The
Court concluded at page 1062, as follows:-
".We have already
observed that Article 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities, (1) to
establish and (2) to administer, educational institutions of their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include
the right to mal administer. The minority
cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by
them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers, possessing any
semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of
teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the
scholars. It stands to reason, then,
that the constitutional right to
administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily
militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid
the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the
institutions to be aided.."
104. While noting that Article 30
referred not only to religious minorities but also to linguistic minorities, it
was held that the Article gave those minorities the right to establish
educational institutions of their choice, and that no limitation could be
placed on the subjects to be taught at such educational institutions and that
general secular education is also comprehended within the scope of Article 30(1). It is to be noted that the argument
addressed and answered in that case was whether a minority aided institution
loses its character as such by admitting non- minority students in terms of
Article 29(2). It was observed that the
admission of 'sprinkling of outsiders' will not deprive the institution of its
minority status. The
opinion expressed therein
does not really go counter to the ultimate view taken by us in regard to the
inter-play of Articles 30(1) and 29(2).
105. In Rev. SidhajbhaiSabhai and
Others vs. State of Bombay and
Another [(1963) 3 SCR
837], this Court had to consider the validity of an order
issued by the Government
of Bombay whereby from the academic year 1955-56, 80% of the seats in the
training colleges for teachers in non-government training colleges were to be
reserved for the teachers nominated by the Government. The petitioners, who belonged to the minority
community, were, inter alia, running a training college for teachers, as also
primary schools. The said primary
schools and college were conducted for the benefit of the religious
denomination of the United Church of Northern India and Indian Christians
generally, though admission was not denied to students belonging to other
communities. The petitioners challenged
the government order requiring 80% of the seats to be filled by nominees of the
government, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioners were members of a
religious denomination and that they constituted a religious minority, and that
the educational institutions had been established primarily for the benefit of
the Christian community. It was the case
of the petitioners that the decision of the Government violated
their fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 30(1), 26(a), (b), (c) and (d),
and 19(1)(f) and (g). While interpreting
Article 30, it was observed by this
Court at pages 849-850 as under:-
".All minorities,
linguistic or religious have by Article 30(1) an absolute right to
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice; and any law or executive
direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under Article
30(1) would to that extent be void.
This, however, is not to say that it is not open to the State to impose
regulations upon the exercise of this right.
The fundamental freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions:
it is a right to establish and administer what are in truth educational
institutions, institutions which cater to the educational needs of the
citizens, or sections thereof.
Regulation made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction,
discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like may
undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not
restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed: they secure the
proper functioning of the institution, in matters educational."
106. While coming to the conclusion
that the right of the private training colleges to admit students of their
choice was severely restricted, this Court referred to the opinion in the
Kerala Education Bill case, but distinguished it by observing that the Court
did not, in that case, lay down any test of reasonableness of the regulation. No general principle on which the
reasonableness of a regulation may be tested was sought to be laid down in the
Kerala Education Bill case and, therefore, it was held in SidhajbhaiSabhai's
case that the opinion in that case was not an authority for the proposition
that all regulative measures, which were not destructive or annihilative of the
character of the institution established by the minority, provided the
regulations were in the national or public interest, were valid. In this connection it was further
held at page 856, as follows:-
"The right
established by Article 30 (1) is a fundamental right declared in terms
absolute. Unlike the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, it is not subject to reasonable
restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for the protection of the
minorities in the matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own
choice. The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by
so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority
educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order
which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys
the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or
national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution,
the right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) will be but a "teasing
illusion", a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be
imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving
grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while
retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational
institution. Such regulation must
satisfy a dual test the test of reasonableness,
and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the
institution and
is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for
the minority community or other persons who resort to it."
107. The aforesaid decision does
indicate that the right under Article 30(1) is not so absolute as to prevent
the government from making any regulation whatsoever. As already noted hereinabove, in
SidhajbhaiSabhai's case, it was laid down that regulations made in the true
interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation,
morality and public order could be imposed. If this is so, it is difficult to
appreciate how the government can be prevented from framing regulations that
are in the national interest, as it seems to be indicated in the passage quoted
hereinabove. Any regulation framed in
the national interest must necessarily apply to all educational institutions,
whether run by the majority or the minority.
Such a limitation must necessarily be read into Article 30. The right under
Article 30(1) cannot be such as to override the national interest or to prevent
the government from framing regulations in that behalf. It is, of course, true that government regulations cannot destroy
the minority character of the institution or
make the right to
establish and administer a mere illusion; but the right under
Article 30 is not so
absolute as to be above the law. It will
further be seen that in SidhajbhaiSabhai's case, no reference was made to
Article 29(2) of the Constitution. This
decision, therefore, cannot be an authority for the proposition canvassed
before us.
108. Our attention was invited to the
decision in Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. vs. The State of
Bihar &Ors. [(1969) 2 SCR 73], but the said case has no application here. In that case, it was contended, on behalf of
the State of Bihar, that, as the protection to the minority under Article 29(1)
was only a right to conserve a distinct language, script or culture of its own,
the college did not qualify for the protection of Article 30(1) because it was
not founded to conserve them and that consequently, it was open to all sections
of the people. The question, therefore,
was whether the college could claim the protection of Section 48-B of the Bihar
Universities Act read with Article 30(1) of the Constitution, only if it proved
that the educational institution was furthering the rights mentioned in Article
29(1). Section 48-B of the Bihar
Universities Act exempted a minority educational institution based on religion
or language from the operation of some of the other provisions of that
Act. This Court, while construing
Article 30, held that its width could not be cut down by introducing in it
considerations on which Article 29(1) was based. Articles 29(1) and 30(1) were held to create
two separate rights, though it was possible that they might meet in a given
case. While dealing with the contention
of the state that the college would not be entitled to the protection under Article
30(1) because it was open to all sections of the people, the Court referred to
the observations in the Kerala Education Bill case, wherein it had been
observed that the real import of Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) was that they
contemplated a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted into
it. The Court otherwise had no occasion
to deal with the applicability of Article 29(2) to Article 30(1).
109. In State of Kerala, Etc. vs. Very
Rev. Mother Provincial, Etc. [(1971) 1 SCR 734], the challenge
was to various provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1969, whose provisions
affected private colleges, particularly those founded by minority communities
in the State of Kerala. The said
provisions, inter alia, sought to provide for the manner in which private
colleges were to be administered through the constitution of the governing body
or managing councils in the manner provided by the Act. Dealing with Article 30, it was observed at
pages 739-40 as follows: -
"Article 30(1) has
been construed before by this Court.
Without referring to those cases it is sufficient to say that the clause contemplates
two rights which are separated in point of time. The first right is the initial right to
establish institutions of the minority's choice. Establishment here means the bringing into being of an institution
and it must be by a minority community.
It matters not if a single philanthropic individual with his own means,
founds the institution or the community at large contributes the funds. The position in law is the same and the
intention in either case must be to found an institution for the benefit of a
minority community by a member of that community. It is equally irrelevant that in addition to the
minority community others from other minority communities or even from the
majority community can take advantage of these institutions. Such other communities bring in income and
they do not have to be turned away to enjoy the protection.
The next part of
the right relates to the administration of such institutions. Administration means 'management of the
affairs' of the institution. This
management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can
mould the institution as they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of
how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular
will be best served. No part of this
management can be taken away and vested in another body without an encroachment
upon the guaranteed right."
The Court, however,
pointed out that an exception to the right under Article 30 was the power with
the state to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters. It was held that the minority institutions
could not be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational
institutions, or under the guise of the exclusive right of management, allowed
to decline to follow the general pattern.
The Court stated that while the management must be left to the minority,
they may be compelled to keep in step with others.
110. The interplay of Article 29 and Article 30
came up for consideration again before this Court in
the D.A.V. College case [1971 (Supp.) SCR 688].
Some of the provisions of the Guru Nanak University Act established
after the reorganization of the State
of Punjab in 1969 provided for the manner in which the governing body was to be
constituted; the body was to include a representative of the University and a
member of the College. These and some other provisions were challenged on the
ground that they were violative of Article 30.
In this connection at page 695, it was observed as follows:-
"It will be observed
that Article 29(1) is wider than Article 30(1), in that, while any Section of
the citizens including the minorities, can invoke the rights guaranteed under
Article 29(1), the rights guaranteed under Article 30(1) are only available to
the minorities based on religion or language.
It is not necessary for Article 30(1) that the minority should be both a
religious minority as well as a linguistic minority. It is sufficient if it is one or the other or
both. A reading of these two
Articles together would lead us to conclude that a religious or linguistic
minority has a right to establish and administer educational institutions
of its choice for effectively conserving its distinctive language, script or
culture, which right however is subject to the regulatory power of the State
for maintaining and facilitating the excellence of its standards. This right is further subject to clause (2)
of Article 29 which provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any
educational institution which is maintained by the State or receives aid out of
State funds, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of
them. While this is so these two articles
are not inter-linked nor does it permit of their being always read
together."
Though it was observed
that Article 30(1) is subject to 29(2), the question whether the preference to
minority students is altogether excluded, was not considered.
111. One
of the questions that arose in this case was as to whether the petitioner was a minority
institution. In this case, it was also
observed that the Hindus of Punjab were a
religious minority in the State of Punjab and that, therefore, they were
entitled to the protection of Article 30(1).
Three of the provisions, which were
sought to be challenged as being violative of Article 30, were Clauses 2(1), 17 and
18 of the statutes framed by the University under Section 19 of the
University Act. Clause 2(1)(a) provided
that, for seeking affiliation, the college
was to have a governing body of not more than 20 persons approved by the Senate
and including, amongst others, two representatives of the University and a
member of the College. Clause 17
required the approval of the Vice-Chancellor for the staff initially appointed
by the College. The said provision also
provided that all subsequent changes in the staff were to be reported to the Vice-Chancellor
for his/her approval. Clause 18 provided
that non-government colleges were to comply with the requirements laid down in
the ordinances governing the service and conduct of teachers in non-government
colleges, as may be framed by the University.
After referring to Kerala Education Bill, Sidhajbai Sabhai and Rev.
Father W. Proost, this Court held that there was no justification for the
provisions contained in Clause 2(1)(a) and Clause 17 of the statutes as they interfered
with the rights of management of the minority educational institutions. P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.,
observed that "these provisions
cannot, therefore, be made as conditions of affiliation, the non-compliance of
which would involve dis-affiliation and consequently they will have to be
struck down as offending Article 30(1)."
112. Clause 18, however, was held not
to suffer from the same vice as Clause 17 because the
provision, insofar as it was applicable to the minority institutions, empowered
the University to prescribe by-regulations governing the service and conduct of
teachers, and that this was in the larger interest of the institutions, and in
order to ensure their efficiency and excellence. In this connection, it was
observed at page 709, that: -
"Uniformity
in the conditions of service and conduct of teachers in all non-Government
Colleges would make for harmony and avoid frustration. Of course while the power to make ordinances
in respect of the matters referred to is unexceptional the nature of the infringement
of the right, if any, under Article 30(1) will depend on the actual purpose and
import of the ordinance when made and the manner in which it is likely to
affect the administration of the educational institution, about which it is not
possible now to predicate."
113. In The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers
College Society &Anr. Etc. vs. State of Gujarat &Anr.
[(1975) 1 SCR 173], this Court had to consider the constitutional validity of
certain provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949, insofar as they were made
to apply to the minority Christian institution. The impugned provisions, inter
alia, provided that the University may determine that all instructions,
teaching and training in courses of studies, in respect of which the University
was competent to hold examinations, would be conducted by the University and
would be imparted by the teachers of the University. Another provision provided that new colleges
that may seek affiliation, were to be the constituent colleges of the
University. The Court considered the scope and ambit of the rights of the
minorities, whether based on religion or language, to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. In dealing with this aspect, Ray, C.J., at
page 192, while considering Articles 25 to 30, observed as follows:-
"Every section of the
public, the majority as well as minority has rights in respect of religion as
contemplated in Articles 25 and 26 and rights in respect of language, script,
culture as contemplated in Article 29.
The whole object of conferring the right on minorities under Article 30
is to ensure that there will be equality between the majority and the
minority. If the minorities do not have
such special protection they will be denied equality."
114. Elaborating on the meaning and
intent of Article 30, the learned Chief Justice further observed as follows:-
"The real reason
embodied in Article 30(1) of the Constitution is the conscience of the nation
that the minorities, religious as well as linguistic, are not prohibited from
establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice for the
purpose of giving their children the best general education to make them
complete men and women of the country.
The minorities are given this protection under Article 30 in order to
preserve and strengthen the integrity and unity of the country. The sphere of
general secular education is intended to develop the commonness of boys and
girls of our country. This is in the
true spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity through the medium of education. If religious or linguistic minorities are not
given protection under Article 30 to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice, they will feel isolated and separate. General secular education will open doors of
perception and act as the natural light of mind for our countrymen to live in
the whole."
115. The Court then considered whether
the religious and linguistic minorities, who have the
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, had
a fundamental right to affiliation.
Recognizing that the affiliation to a University consisted of two parts,
the first part relating to syllabi, curricula, courses of instruction, the
qualifications of teachers, library, laboratories, conditions regarding health
and hygiene of students (aspects relating to establishment of educational
institutions), and the second part consisting of terms and conditions regarding
the management of institutions, it was held that with regard to affiliation, a
minority institution must follow the statutory measures regulating educational
standards and efficiency, prescribed courses of study, courses of instruction,
the principles regarding the qualification of teachers, educational
qualifications for entry of students into educational institutions, etc.
116. While considering the right of the religious
and linguistic minorities to
administer their
educational institutions, it was observed by Ray, C.J., at page 194, as
follows:-
"The right to
administer is said to consist of four principal matters. First is the right to choose its managing or
governing body. It is said that the founders of the minority institution have
faith and confidence in their own committee or body consisting of persons selected
by them. Second is the right to choose
its teachers. It is said that
minority institutions want teachers to have compatibility with the ideals, aims
and aspirations of the institution.
Third is the right not to be compelled to refuse admission to
students. In other words, the minority
institutions want to have the right to admit students of their
choice subject to
reasonable regulations about academic qualifications. Fourth is the right to use its properties and assets for the
benefit of its own institution."
117. While considering this right to administer,
it was held that the same was not an absolute right and that the right was not
free from regulation. While referring to
the observations of Das, C.J., in the Kerala Education Bill case, it was reiterated
in the St. Xaviers College case that the right to administer was not a right to
mal-administer. Elaborating the
minority's right to administer at page 196, it was observed as follows:-
"..The minority
institutions have the right to administer institutions. This right implies the
obligation and duty of the minority institutions to render the very best to the
students. In the right of
administration, checks and balances in the shape of regulatory measures are
required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service. The right to administer is to be tempered
with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth administration. The best administration will reveal no trace
or colour of minority. A minority
institution should shine in exemplary eclecticism in the administration of the institution. The best compliment that can be paid to a
minority institution is that it does not rest on or proclaim its minority character."
118. Ray, C.J., concluded by observing
at page 200, as follows:- "The ultimate goal of a minority institution
too imparting general secular education is advancement of learning. This Court has consistently held that it is
not only permissible but also desirable to regulate everything in educational
and academic matters for achieving excellence and uniformity in standards of
education. In the field of administration it is not reasonable to claim that
minority institutions will have complete autonomy. Checks on the
administration may be
necessary in order to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound and
will serve the academic needs of the institution. The right of a minority to administer its educational
institution involves, as part of it, a correlative duty of good
administration."
119. In a concurrent judgment, while
noting that "clause (2) of Article 29 forbids the denial of admission to
citizens into any educational institution
maintained by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of
religion, race, caste,
language or any of then", Khanna, J. then examined Article
30, and observed at page
222, as follows:-
"Clause (1) of
Article 30 gives right to all minorities, whether based on religion or
language, to establish and administer educational institutions of their
choice. Analyzing that clause it would
follow that the right which has been conferred by the clause is on two types of
minorities. Those minorities may be
based either on religion or on language.
The right conferred upon the said minorities is to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice. The word "establish" indicates the
right to bring into existence, while the right to administer an institution
means the right to effectively manage and conduct the affairs of the
institution. Administration connotes management
of the affairs of the institution. The
management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can
mould the institution as they think fit and in accordance with their ideas of
how the interest of the community in general and the institution in particular
will be best served. The words
"of their choice" qualify the educational institutions and show that
the educational institutions established and administered by the minorities
need not be of some particular class; the minorities have the right and freedom
to establish
and administer such
educational institutions as they choose.
Clause (2) of Article 30 prevents the State from making discrimination
in the matter of grant of aid to any educational institution on the ground that
the institution is under the management of a minority whether based on religion
or language.
120. Explaining the rationale behind
Article 30, it was observed at page 224, as follows:-
"The idea of giving
some special rights to the minorities is not to have a kind of a privileged or
pampered section of the population but to give to the minorities a sense of
security and a feeling of confidence. The great leaders of India since time
immemorial had preached the doctrine of tolerance and catholicity of
outlook. Those noble ideas were enshrined
in the Constitution. Special rights for
minorities were designed not to create inequality. Their real effect was to bring about equality
by ensuring the preservation of the minority institutions and by guaranteeing
to the minorities autonomy in the matter of the administration of these
institutions. The differential treatment
for the minorities by giving them
special rights is intended to bring about an equilibrium, so that the
ideal of equality may not be reduced to a mere abstract idea but should
become a living reality and result in true, genuine
equality, an equality not merely in theory but also in fact."
121. While advocating that provisions
of the Constitution should be construed according to the
liberal, generous and sympathetic approach, and after considering the
principles which could be discerned by him from the earlier decisions of this
Court, Khanna, J., observed at page 234, as follows:-
"..The minorities are
as much children of the soil as the majority and the approach has been to
ensure that nothing should be done as might deprive the minorities of a sense
of belonging, of a feeling of security, of a consciousness of equality and of
the awareness that the conservation of their religion, culture, language and
script as also the protection of their educational institutions is a
fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution. The same generous, liberal and sympathetic approach should weigh
with the courts in construing Articles 29 and 30 as marked the deliberations of
the Constitution- makers
in drafting those articles and making them part of the fundamental rights. The safeguarding of the interest of the
minorities amongst sections of
population is as important as the protection of the interest amongst
individuals of persons who are below the age of majority or are otherwise
suffering from some kind of infirmity.
The Constitution and the laws made by civilized nations, therefore, generally
contain provisions for the protection of those interests. It can, indeed, be said to be an index of the
level of civilization and catholicity of a nation as to how far their
minorities feel secure and are not subject to any discrimination or
suppression."
122. The learned Judge then observed
that the right of the minorities to administer educational institutions did not
prevent the making of reasonable regulations in respect of these
institutions. Recognizing that the right
to administer educational institutions could not include the right to
mal-administer, it was held that regulations could be lawfully imposed, for the
receiving of grants and recognition, while permitting the institution to retain
its character as a minority institution. The regulation "must satisfy a
dual test the test of reasonableness, and
the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution
and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education
for the minority community or other persons who resort to it." It was
permissible for the authorities to prescribe regulations, which must be
complied with, before a minority institution could seek or retain affiliation
and recognition. But it was also stated that the regulations made by the
authority should not impinge upon the minority character of the institution. Therefore, a balance has to be kept
between
the two objectives that of ensuring the standard of excellence
of the institution, and that of preserving the right of the minorities to
establish and administer their educational institutions. Regulations that embraced and reconciled the
two objectives could be considered to be reasonable. This, in our view, is the correct approach to
the problem.
123. After referring to the earlier
cases in relation to the appointment of teachers, it was noted by Khanna, J.,
that the conclusion which followed was that a law which interfered with a
minority's choice of qualified teachers, or its disciplinary control over
teachers and other members of the staff of the institution, was void, as it was
violative of Article 30(1). While it
was permissible for the state and its educational authorities to prescribe the
qualifications of teachers, it was held that once the teachers possessing the
requisite qualifications were selected by the minorities for their educational
institutions, the state would have no right to veto the selection of those
teachers. The selection and
appointment of teachers for an educational institution was regarded as one of
the essential ingredients under Article 30(1).
The Court's attention was drawn to the fact that in the Kerala Education
Bill case, this Court had opined that Clauses (11) and (12) made it obligatory
for all aided schools to select teachers from a panel selected from each
district by the Public Service Commission and that no teacher of an aided
school could be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without the previous sanction
of the authorized officer. At page 245,
Khanna, J., observed that in cases subsequent to the opinion in the Kerala
Education Bill case, this Court had held similar provisions as Clause (11) and
Clause (12) to be violative of Article 30(1) of the minority
institution. He then observed as
follows:-
"..The
opinion expressed by this Court in Re Kerala Education Bill (supra) was of an
advisory character and though great weight should be attached to it because of
its persuasive value, the said opinion cannot override the opinion subsequently
expressed by this Court in contested cases.
It is the law declared by this Court in the subsequent contested cases
which would have a binding effect. The
words "as at present advised" as well as the preceding sentence
indicate that the view expressed by this Court in Re Kerala Education Bill in
this respect was
hesitant and tentative and not a final view in the matter.."
124. In Lilly Kurian vs. Sr. Lewina
and Ors. [(1979) 1 SCR 820], this Court struck down the
power of the Vice-Chancellor to veto the decision of the management to impose a
penalty on a teacher. It was held that
the power of the Vice-Chancellor, while hearing an appeal against the
imposition of the penalty, was uncanalized and unguided. In Christian Medical College Hospital Employees' Union &Anr.
vs. Christian Medical College Vellore Association & Ors. [(1988) 1 SCR 546], this Court upheld the
application of industrial law tominority colleges, and it
was held that providing a remedy against unfair dismissals would not infringe
Article 30. In Gandhi Faizeam College
Shahajhanpur vs. University of Agra
and Another [(1975) 3 SCR 810],
a law which sought to regulate the working of minority institutions by
providing that a broad-based management committee could be re-constituted by
including therein the Principal and the senior-most teacher, was valid and not
violative of the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. In All Saints High School, Hyderabad Etc.
Etc. vs. Government of A.P. &Ors. Etc. [(1980) 2 SCR 924], a regulation
providing that no teacher would be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, or
terminated otherwise except with the prior approval of the competent authority,
was held to be invalid, as it sought to confer an unqualified power upon the
competent authority. In Frank Anthony
Public School Employees Association vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1987) 1 SCR
238], the regulation providing for prior approval for dismissal was held to be
invalid, while the provision for an appeal against the order of dismissal by an
employee to a Tribunal was upheld. The
regulation requiring prior approval before suspending an employee was held to
be valid, but the provision, which exempted unaided minority schools from the
regulation that equated the pay and other benefits of
employees of recognized schools with those in schools run by the authority, was
held to be invalid and violative of the equality clause. It was held by this Court that the
regulations regarding pay and allowances for teachers and staff would not
violate Article 30.
125. In the St. Stephen's College
case, the right of minorities to administer educational institutions and the
applicability of Article 29(2) to an institution to which Article 30(1) was
applicable came up for consideration.
St. Stephen's College claimed to be a minority institution, which was
affiliated to Delhi University; the College had its own provisions with regard
to the admission of students. This
provision postulated that applications would be invited by the college by a
particular date. The applications were
processed and a cut-off percentage for each subject was determined by the Head
of the respective Departments and a list of potentially suitable candidates was
prepared on the basis of 1:4 and 1:5 ratios for Arts and Science students
respectively, and they were then called for an interview (i.e., for every
available seat in the Arts Department, four candidates were called for
interviews; similarly, for every available seat in the Science Department, five
candidates were called for interviews).
In respect of Christian students, a relaxation of upto 10% was given in
determining the cut-off point. Thereafter,
the interviews were conducted and admission was granted. The Delhi University, however, had issued a
circular, which provided that admission should be granted to the various
courses purely on the basis of merit, i.e., the percentage of marks secured by
the students in the qualifying examination.
The said circular did not postulate any interview. Thereafter, the admission policy of St.
Stephen's College was challenged by a petition under Article 32. It was contended by the petitioners that the
College was bound to follow the University policy, rules and regulations
regarding admission, and further argued that it was not a minority institution,
and in the alternative, it was not entitled to discriminate against students on
the ground of religion, as the college was receiving grant-in-aid from the
government, and that such discrimination was violative of Article 29(2). The
College had also filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court taking the stand that
it was a religious minority institution, and that the circular of the
University regarding admission violated its fundamental right under Article
30. This Court held that St. Stephen's
College was a minority institution. With
regard to the second question as to whether the college was bound by the
University circulars regarding admission, this Court, by a majority of 4-1,
upheld the admission procedure used by the College, even though it was
different from the one laid down by the University. In this context, the contention of the College was that it had
been following its own admission programme for more than a hundred years and that it had built a
tradition of excellence in a number of distinctive activities. The College
challenged the University circular on the ground that it was not regulatory in
nature, and that it violated its right under Article 30. Its submission was that if students were admitted purely on
the basis of marks obtained by them in the qualifying examination, it would not
be possible for any Christian student to gain admission. The college had also found that unless a concession was
afforded, the Christian students could not be brought within the zone of
consideration as they generally lacked merit when compared to the other
applicants. This Court referred to the
earlier decisions, and with regard to Article 30(1), observed at page 596, paragraph
54, as follows:-
"The minorities
whether based on religion or language have the right to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice. The administration of
educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) means 'management
of the affairs of the institution'. This management must be free from control
so that the founder or their nominees can mould the institution as they think
fit, and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community
in general and the institution in particular will be best served. But the standards of education are not a
part of the management as such. The standard
concerns the body politic and is governed by considerations of the advancement
of the country and its people. Such
regulations do not bear directly upon management although they may indirectly affect
it. The State, therefore has the right
to regulate the standard of education and allied matters. Minority institutions cannot be permitted to
fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational
institutions. They cannot decline to
follow the general pattern of education under the guise of exclusive right of management. While the management must be left to them,
they may be compelled to keep in step with others..."
126. It was further noticed that the
right under Article 30(1) had to be read subject to the power of the state to
regulate education, educational standards and allied matters. In this connection, at pages 598-99,
paragraph 59, it was observed as follows:-
"The need for a
detailed study on this aspect is indeed not necessary. The right to minorities
whether religious or linguistic, to administer educational institutions and the
power of the State to regulate academic matters and management is now fairly
well settled. The right to administer
does not include the right to mal administer.
The State being the controlling authority has right and duty to regulate
all academic matters. Regulations which
will serve the interests of students and teachers, and to preserve the
uniformity in standards of education among the affiliated institutions could be
made. The minority institutions
cannot claim immunity against such general pattern and standard or against
general laws such as laws relating to law and order, health, hygiene, labor
relations, social welfare legislation contracts, torts etc. which are
applicable to all communities. So long
as the basic right of minorities to manage educational institution is not taken
away, the State is competent to make regulatory
legislation. Regulations, however, shall
not have the effect of depriving the right of minorities to educate their
children in their own institution. That
is a privilege which is implied in the right conferred by Article 30(1).
127. Dealing with the question of the
selection of students, it was accepted that the right to select students for
admission was a part of administration, and that this power could be regulated,
but it was held that the regulation must be reasonable and should be conducive
to the welfare of the minority institution or for the betterment of those who
resort to it. Bearing this principle in
mind, this Court took note of the fact that if the College was to admit
students as per the circular issued by the University, it would have to deny
admissions to the students belonging to the Christian community because of the
prevailing situation that even after the concession, only a small number of
minority applicants would gain admission.
It was the case of the College that the selection was made on the basis of
the candidate's academic record, and his/her performance at the interview keeping
in mind his/her all round competence, his/her capacity to benefit from attendance
at the College, as well as his/her potential to contribute to the life of the College.
While observing that the oral interview as a supplementary test and not as the
exclusive test for assessing the suitability of the candidates for college admission had been
recognized by this Court, this Court observed that the admission programme of the
college "based on the test of promise and accomplishment of
candidates seems to be better than the blind method of selection based on the
marks secured in the qualifying examinations." The Court accordingly held that St. Stephen's
College was not bound by the impugned circulars of the University. This Court then dealt with the question as to
whether a preference in favour of, or a reservation of seats for candidates
belonging to, its own community by the minority institutions would be invalid
under Article 29(2) of the Constitution.
After referring to the Constituent Assembly Debates and the proceedings
of the Draft Committee that led to the incorporation of Articles 29 and 30,
this Court proceeded to examine the question of the true import and effect of Articles
29(2) and 30(1) of the Constitution. On
behalf of the institutions, it was argued that a preference given to minority
candidates in their own educational institutions, on the
ground that those candidates belonged to that minority community, was not
violative of Article 29(2), and that in the exercise of Article 30(1), the minorities were
entitled to establish and administer educational institutions for the
exclusive advantage of their own community's candidates. This contention was not accepted by this
Court on two grounds. Firstly, it was held that institutional preference to
minority candidates based on religion was apparently an institutional
discrimination on the forbidden ground of religion the Court stated that "if an educational
institution says yes to one candidate but says no to other candidate on the
ground of religion, it amounts to discrimination on the ground of religion. The mandate of Article 29(2) is that there
shall not be any such discrimination."
It further held that, as pointed out in the Kerala Education Bill case,
the minorities could not establish educational institutions for the benefit of their
own community alone. For if such was the
aim, Article 30(1) would have been differently worded and it would have
contained the words "for their own community". In this regard, it would be useful to bear in
mind that the Court at page 607, paragraph 81, noticed that:-
"Even in practice,
such claims are likely to be met with considerable hostility. It may not be conducive to have a relatively
homogeneous society. It may lead to
religious bigotry which is the bane of mankind.
In the nation building with secular character sectarian schools or
colleges, segregated faculties or universities for imparting general secular
education are undesirable and they may undermine secular democracy. They would be inconsistent with the central concept
of secularism and equality embedded in the Constitution. Every educational
institution irrespective of community to which it belongs is a 'melting pot' in
our national life. The students and teachers
are the critical ingredients. It is
there they develop respect for, and tolerance of, the cultures and beliefs of
others. It is essential therefore, that
there should be proper mix of students of different communities in all
educational institutions. 128. The Court then dealt with the contention on
behalf of the University that the minority
institutions receiving government aid were bound by the mandate of Article
29(2), and that they could not prefer candidates from their own community. The Court referred to the decision in the
case of Champakam Dorairajan (supra), but
observed as follows:
"..the fact that
Article 29(2) applied to minorities as well as non-minorities did not mean that
it was intended to nullify the special right guaranteed to minorities in
Article 30(1). Article 29(2) deals with non-discrimination
and is available only to individuals.
General equality by non-discrimination is not the only need of
minorities. Minority rights under majority rule implies more than
non-discrimination; indeed, it begins with non-discrimination. Protection of interests and institutions and
the advancement of opportunity are just as important. Differential treatment that distinguishes
them from the majority is a must to preserve their basic characteristics."
129. Dealing with the submission that
in a secular democracy the government could not be
utilized to promote the interest of any particular community, and that the
minority institution was not entitled to state aid as of right, this Court, at page
609, paragraph 87, held as follows:-
"It is quite true
that there is no entitlement to State grant for minority educational
institutions. There was only a stop-gap
arrangement under Article 337 for the Anglo-Indian community to receive State grants. There is no similar provision for
other minorities to get grant from the State.
But under Article 30(2), the State is under an obligation to maintain equality
of treatment in granting aid to educational institutions. Minority institutions are not to be treated differently
while giving financial assistance. They
are entitled to get the financial assistance much the same way as the
institutions of the majority communities."
130. It
was further held that the state could lay down reasonable conditions for
obtaining grant-in-aid and for its proper utilization, but that the state had
no power to compel minority institutions to give up their rights under Article
30(1). After referring to the Kerala Education Bill case and SidhajbhaiSabhai's
case, the Court observed at page 609, paragraph 88, as follows:-
"In the latter case
this court observed at SCR pages 856-57 that the regulation which may lawfully
be imposed as a condition of receiving grant must be directed in making the
institution an effective minority educational institution. The regulation cannot change the character of
the minority institution. Such
regulations must satisfy a dual test; the test of reasonableness, and the test
that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution. It must be conducive to making the
institution and effective vehicle of education for the minority community or
other persons who resort to it. It is
thus evident that the rights under Article 30(1) remain unaffected even after
securing financial assistance from the government."
131. After referring to the following
observations in D.A.V. College case, "..The
right of a religious or linguistic minority to establish and administer
educational institutions of its choice under Article 30(1) is subject to the
regulatory power of the State for maintaining and facilitating the excellence
of its standards. This right is further
subject to Article 29(2), which provides that no citizen shall be denied admission
into any educational institution which is maintained by the State or receives
aid out of State funds, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or
any of them..." the learned Judges remarked at page 610 (para 91) that in
the said case, the Court was not deciding the question that had arisen before
them.
132. According to the learned Judges,
the question of the interplay of Article 29(2) with Article
30(1) had arisen in that case (St. Stephen's case) for the first time, and had
not been considered by the Court earlier; they observed that "we are on
virgin soil, not on trodden ground".
Dealing with the interplay of these two Articles, it was observed, at
page 612, paragraph 96, as follows:-
"The collective
minority right is required to be made functional and is not to be reduced to
useless lumber. A meaningful right must
be shaped, moulded and created under Article 30(1), while at the same time
affirming the right of individuals under Article 29(2). There is need to strike a balance between the
two competing rights. It is necessary to
mediate between Article 29(2) and Article 30(1), between letter and spirit of
these articles, between traditions of the past and the convenience of the
present, between society's need for stability and its need for
change."
133. The two competing rights are the
right of the citizen not to be denied admission granted under Article 29(2),
and right of the religious or linguistic minority to administer and establish
an institution of its choice granted under Article 30(1). While treating Article 29(2) as a
facet of equality, the Court gave a contextual interpretation to Articles 29(2)
and 30(1) while rejecting the extreme contentions on both sides, i.e., on
behalf of the institutions that Article 29(2) did not prevent a minority
institution to preferably admit only members belonging to the minority
community, and the contention on behalf of the State that Article 29(2)
prohibited any preference in favour of a minority community for whose benefit
the institution was established. The
Court concluded, at pages 613-14, para 102, as follows:-
"In the light of all
these principles and factors, and in view of the importance which the
Constitution attaches to protective measures to minorities under Article 30(1),
the minority aided educational institutions are entitled to prefer their
community candidates to maintain the minority character of the institutions
subject of course to conformity with the University standard. The State may regulate the intake in this
category with due regard to the need of the community in the area which the
institution is intended to serve.
But in no case such intake shall exceed 50 per cent of the annual admission. The
minority institutions shall make available at least 50 per cent of the annual
admission to members of communities other than the minority community. The admission of other community candidates
shall be done purely on the basis of merit."
134. If we keep these basic features,
as highlighted in St. Stephen's case, in view, then the real purposes
underlying Articles 29(2) and 30 can be better appreciated.
135. We agree with the contention of
the learned Solicitor General that the Constitution in Part III does not
contain or give any absolute right. All
rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are subject to at least other
provisions of the said Part. It is
difficult to comprehend that the framers of the Constitution would have given
such an absolute right to the religious or linguistic minorities, which would
enable them to establish and administer educational institutions in a manner so
as to be in conflict with the other Parts of the Constitution. We find it difficult to accept that in the
establishment and administration of educational institutions by the religious
and linguistic minorities, no law of the land, even the Constitution, is to
apply to them.
136. Decisions of this Court have held
that the right to administer does not include the right to mal-administer. It has also been held that the right to administer is not
absolute, but must be subject to reasonable regulations for the benefit of the
institutions as the vehicle of education, consistent with national interest. General laws of the land applicable to all
persons have been held to be applicable to the minority institutions also for example, laws relating to taxation, sanitation,
social welfare, economic regulation, public order and morality.
137. It follows from the aforesaid
decisions that even though the words of Article 30(1) are unqualified, this
Court has held that at least certain other laws of the land pertaining to
health, morality and standards of education apply. The right under Article 30(1) has, therefore,
not been held to be absolute or above other provisions of the law, and we
reiterate the same. By the same analogy,
there is no reason why regulations or conditions concerning, generally, the
welfare of students and teachers should not be made applicable in order to
provide a proper academic atmosphere, as such provisions do not in any way
interfere with the right of administration or management under Article 30(1).
138. As we look at it, Article 30(1)
is a sort of guarantee or assurance to
the linguistic and
religious minority institutions of their right to establish and
administer educational
institutions of their choice. Secularism
and equality being two of the basic features of the Constitution, Article 30(1)
ensures protection to the linguistic and religious minorities, thereby preserving
the secularism of the country.
Furthermore, the principles of equality must necessarily apply to the enjoyment
of such rights. No law can be framed
that will discriminate against such minorities with regard to the establishment
and administration of educational institutions vis--vis other educational
institutions. Any law or rule or
regulation that would put the educational institutions run by the minorities at
a disadvantage when compared to the institutions run by the others will have to
be struck down. At the same time, there also cannot be any reverse
discrimination. It was observed in St.
Xaviers College case, at page 192, that "the whole object of conferring
the right on minorities under
Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between the majority and
the minority. If the minorities do not
have such special protection, they will be denied equality." In other words, the essence of Article 30(1)
is to ensure equal treatment between the majority and the minority institutions. No one type or category of institution should
be disfavoured or, for that matter, receive more favourable treatment than
another. Laws of the land, including rules and regulations, must apply equally
to the majority institutions as well as to the minority institutions. The minority institutions must be allowed to do
what the non-minority institutions are permitted to do.
139. Like any other private unaided
institutions, similar unaided educational institutions
administered by linguistic or religious minorities are assured maximum autonomy
in relation thereto; e.g., method of recruitment of teachers, charging of fees
and admission of students. They will have to comply with the conditions of
recognition, which cannot be such as to whittle down the right under Article
30.
140. We have now to address the
question of whether Article 30 gives a right to ask for a grant or aid from the
state, and secondly, if it does get aid, to examine to what extent its autonomy
in administration, specifically in the matter of admission to the educational
institution established by the community, can be curtailed or regulated.
141. The grant of aid is not a
constitutional imperative. Article 337
only gives the right to assistance by way of grant to the Anglo-Indian
community for a specified period of time.
If no aid is granted to anyone, Article 30(1) would not justify a demand
for aid, and it cannot be said that the absence of aid makes the right under
Article 30(1) illusory. The founding
fathers have not incorporated the right to grants in Article 30, whereas they
have done so under Article 337; what, then, is the meaning, scope and effect of
Article 30(2)? Article 30(2) only means what
it states, viz., that a minority institution shall not be discriminated against
when aid to educational institutions is granted. In other words the state
cannot, when it chooses to grant aid to educational institutions, deny aid to a
religious or linguistic minority institution only on the ground that the
management of that institution is with the minority. We would, however, like to clarify that if an
abject surrender of the right to management is made a condition of aid, the
denial of aid would be violative of Article 30(2). However, conditions of aid that do not
involve a surrender of the substantial right of management would not be
inconsistent with constitutional guarantees, even if they indirectly impinge
upon some facet of administration. If,
however, aid were denied on the ground that the educational institution is
under the management of a minority, then such a denial would be completely
invalid.
142. The implication of Article 30(2)
is also that it recognizes that the minority nature of the
institution should continue, notwithstanding the grant of aid. In other words,
when a grant is given to all institutions for imparting secular education, a minority
institution is also entitled to receive it, subject to the fulfillment of the
requisite criteria, and the state gives the grant knowing that a linguistic or minority
educational institution will also receive the same. Of course, the state cannot be compelled to
grant aid, but the receipt of aid cannot be a reason for altering the nature or
character of the recipient educational institution.
143. This means that the right under
Article 30(1) implies that any grant that is given by the state to the minority
institution cannot have such conditions attached to it, which will in any way
dilute or abridge the rights of the minority institution to establish and
administer that institution. The conditions
that can normally be permitted to be imposed, on the educational institutions
receiving the grant, must be related to the proper utilization of the grant and
fulfillment of the objectives of the grant.
Any such secular conditions so laid, such as a proper audit with regard
to the utilization of the funds and the manner in which the funds are to be
utilized, will be applicable and would not dilute the minority status of the educational
institutions. Such conditions would be
valid if they are also imposed on other educational institutions receiving the
grant.
144. It cannot be argued that no
conditions can be imposed while giving aid to a minority institution. Whether it is an institution run by the
majority or the minority, all conditions that have relevance to the proper
utilization of the grant-in-aid by an educational institution can be
imposed. All that Article 30(2) states
is that on the ground that an institution is under the management of a
minority, whether based on religion or language, grant of aid to that
educational institution cannot be discriminated against, if other educational
institutions are entitled to receive aid.
The conditions for grant or non-grant of aid to educational institutions
have to be uniformly applied, whether it is a majority-run institution or a
minority-run institution. As in the case
of a majority-run institution, the moment a minority institution obtains a
grant of aid, Article 28 of the Constitution comes into play. When an
educational institution is maintained out of State funds, no religious instruction can be
provided therein. Article 28(1) does not
state that it applies only to educational institutions that are not established
or maintained by religious or linguistic minorities. Furthermore, upon the receipt
of aid, the provisions of Article 28(3) would apply to all educational
institutions whether run by the minorities or the non-minorities. Article 28(3) is the right of a person
studying in a state recognized institution or in an educational institution
receiving aid from state funds, not to take part in any religious instruction,
if imparted by such institution, without his/her consent (or his/her guardian's
consent if such a person is a minor). Just as Article 28(1) and (3) become
applicable the moment any educational institution takes aid, likewise, Article
29(2) would also be attracted and become applicable to an educational
institution maintained by the state or receiving aid out of state funds. It was strenuously contended that the
right to give admission is one of the essential ingredients of the right to
administer conferred on the religious or linguistic minority, and that this
right should not be curtailed in any manner.
It is difficult to accept this
contention. If Article 28(1) and (3) apply to a minority institution that receives
aid out of state funds, there is nothing in the language of Article 30 that
would make the provisions of Article 29(2) inapplicable. Like Article 28(1) and Article
28(3), Article 29(2) refers to "any educational institution maintained by
the State or receiving aid out of State funds". A minority institution would fall within the
ambit of Article 29(2) in the same manner in which Article 28(1) and Article
28(3) would be applicable to an aided minority institution. It is true that one of the rights to
administer an educational institution is to grant admission to the
students. As long as an educational
institution, whether belonging to the minority or the majority community, does
not receive aid, it would, in our opinion, be its right and discretion to grant
admission to such students as it chooses or selects subject to what has been
clarified before. Out of the various
rights that the minority institution has in the administration of the
institution, Article 29(2) curtails the right to grant admission to a certain
extent. By virtue of Article 29(2), no citizen can be denied
admission by an aided minority institution on the grounds only of religion,
race, caste, language or any of them. It
is no doubt true that Article 29(2) does curtail one of the powers of the
minority institution, but on receiving aid, some of the rights that an unaided
minority institution has, are also curtailed by Article 28(1) and 28(3). A minority educational institution has a
right to impart religious instruction this right is taken away by Article
28(1), if that minority institution is maintained wholly out of state
funds. Similarly on receiving aid out of
state funds or on being recognized by the state, the absolute right of a minority
institution requiring a student to attend religious instruction is curtailed by
Article 28(3). If the curtailment of
the right to administer a minority institution on receiving aid or being wholly
maintained out of state funds as provided by Article 28 is valid, there is no
reason why Article 29(2) should not be held to be applicable. There is nothing in the language of Article
28(1) and (3), Article 29(2) and Article 30 to suggest that, on receiving aid,
Article 28(1) and (3) will apply, but Article 29(2) will not. Therefore, the contention that the
institutions covered by Article 30 are outside the injunction of Article 29(2)
cannot be accepted.
145. What is the true scope and effect
of Article 29(2)? Article 29(2) is capable of two
interpretations one interpretation, which
is put forth by the Solicitor General and the
other counsel for the different States, is that a minority institution
receiving aid cannot deny admission to any citizen on the grounds of religion,
race, caste, language or any of them.
In other words, the minority institution, once it takes any aid, cannot make
any reservation for its own community or show a preference at the time of
admission, i.e., if the educational institution was a private unaided minority
institution, it is free to admit all students of its own community, but once
aid is received, Article 29(2) makes it obligatory on the institution not to
deny admission to a citizen just because he does not belong to the minority
community that has established the institution.
146. The other interpretation that is
put forth is that Article 29(2) is a protection against
discrimination on the ground of religion, race, caste or language, and does not
in any way come into play where the minority institution prefers students of
its choice. To put it differently, denying admission,
even though seats are available, on the ground of the applicant's religion,
race, caste or language, is prohibited, but preferring students of minority
groups does not violate Article 29(2).
147. It is relevant to note that
though Article 29 carries the head note
"Protection of
interests of minorities" it does not use the expression
"minorities" in its text. The
original proposal of the Advisory Committee in the Constituent Assembly
recommended the following:-
""(1) Minorities
in every unit shall be protected in respect of their language, script and culture and no laws or
regulations may be enacted that may operate oppressively or prejudicially in
this respect." [B. Siva Rao, "Select
Documents" (1957) Vol. 2 page 281] But after the clause was
considered by the Drafting Committee on 1st November, 1947, it emerged
with substitute of 'section of citizens'.[B. Siva Rao, Select Documents (1957)
Vol.3, pages 525-26. Clause 23, Draft Constitution]. It was explained that the
intention had always been to use 'minority' in a wide sense, so as to include
(for example) Maharashtrians who settled in Bengal. (7 C.A.D. pages 922- 23)"
148. Both Articles 29 and 30 form a
part of the fundamental rights Chapter in Part III of the Constitution. Article 30 is confined to minorities, be it
religious or linguistic, and unlike Article 29(1), the right available under
the said Article cannot be availed by any section of citizens. The main distinction between Article 29(1) and
Article 30(1) is that in the former, the right is confined to conservation of
language, script or culture. As
was observed in the Father W. Proost case, the right given by Article 29(1) is
fortified by Article 30(1), insofar as minorities are concerned. In the St. Xaviers College case, it was held
that the right to establish an educational institution is not confined to
conservation of language, script or culture.
When constitutional provisions are interpreted, it has to be borne in
mind that the interpretation should be such as to further the object of their
incorporation. They cannot be read in isolation and have to be read
harmoniously to provide meaning and purpose.
They cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders another provision
redundant. If necessary, a purposive and
harmonious interpretation should be given.
149. Although the right to administer
includes within it a right to grant admission to students of
their choice under Article 30(1), when such a minority institution is granted the
facility of receiving grant-in-aid, Article 29(2) would apply, and necessarily,
therefore, one of the rights of administration of the minorities would be eroded
to some extent. Article 30(2) is an
injunction against the state not to discriminate against the minority
educational institution and prevent it from receiving aid on the ground that
the institution is under the management of a minority. While, therefore, a minority educational
institution receiving grant-in- aid would not be completely outside the
discipline of Article 29(2) of the Constitution, by no stretch of imagination
can the rights guaranteed under Article 30(1) be annihilated. It is in this context that some interplay
between Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) is required. As observed quite aptly in St. Stephen's case "the fact that
Article 29(2) applies to minorities as well as non-minorities does not mean
that it was intended to nullify the special right guaranteed to minorities in Article
30(1)." The word "only" used in Article 29(2) is of considerable
significance and has been used for some avowed purpose. Denying admission to non-minorities for the purpose of
accommodating minority students to a reasonable extent will not be only on
grounds of religion etc., but is primarily meant to preserve the minority
character of the institution and to effectuate the guarantee under Article
30(1). The best possible way is to hold
that as long as the minority educational institution
permits admission of citizens belonging to the non-minority class to a
reasonable extent based upon merit, it will not be an infraction of Article 29(2),
even though the institution admits students of the minority group of its own choice
for whom the institution was meant. What
would be a reasonable extent would depend upon variable factors, and it may not
be advisable to fix any specific percentage.
The situation would vary according to the type of institution and the nature
of education that is being imparted in the institution. Usually, at the school level,
although it may be possible to fill up all the seats with students of the minority
group, at the higher level, either in colleges or in technical institutions, it
may not be possible to fill up all the seats with the students of the minority
group.
However, even if it is
possible to fill up all the seats with students of the minority group, the
moment the institution is granted aid, the institution will have to admit students
of the non-minority group to a reasonable extent, whereby the character of the
institution is not annihilated, and at the same time, the rights of the citizen
engrafted under Article 29(2) are not subverted. It is for this reason that a variable percentage
of admission of minority students depending on the type of institution and
education is desirable, and indeed, necessary, to promote the constitutional guarantees
enshrined in both Article 29(2) and Article 30.
150. At this stage, it will be
appropriate to refer to the following observations of B.P.
Jeevan Reddy, J., in IndraSawhney vs. Union of India and Others [1992 Supp. (3) SCC 215] at page 657,
paragraph 683, as follows:-
"Before we proceed to
deal with the question, we may be permitted to make a few observations: The
questions arising herein are not only of great moment and consequence, they are
also extremely delicate and sensitive.
They represent complex problems of Indian society, wrapped and presented
to us as constitutional and legal questions.
On some of these questions, the decisions of this Court have not been uniform. They speak with more than one voice. Several opposing points of view have been
pressed upon us with equal force and passion and quite often with great
emotion. We recognize that these viewpoints
are held genuinely by the respective exponents.
Each of them feels his own point
of view is the only right one. We
cannot, however, agree with all of them.
We have to find and we have tried
our best to find answers which according
to us are the right ones constitutionally and legally. Though, we are sitting in a larger Bench, we
have kept in mind the relevance and significance of the principle of stare
decisis. We are conscious of the fact
that in law certainty, consistency and continuity are highly desirable
features. Where a decision has stood the
test of time and has never been doubted, we
have respected it unless, of course, there are compelling and
strong reasons to depart from it. Where,
however, such uniformity is not found, we have tried to answer the question on
principle keeping in mind the scheme and goal of our Constitution and the
material placed before us."
151. The right of the aided minority
institution to preferably admit students of its community, when Article 29(2)
was applicable, has been clarified by this Court over a decade ago in the St.
Stephen's College case. While upholding
the procedure for admitting students, this Court also held that aided minority educational
institutions were entitled to preferably admit their community candidates so as
to maintain the minority character of the institution, and that the state may
regulate the intake in this category with due regard to the area that the institution
was intended to serve, but that this intake should not be more than 50% in any
case. Thus, St. Stephen's endeavoured to
strike a balance between the two Articles. Though we accept the ratio of St.
Stephen's, which has held the field for over a decade, we have compelling
reservations in accepting the rigid percentage stipulated therein. As Article 29 and Article 30 apply not only
to institutions of higher education but also to schools, a ceiling of 50% would
not be proper. It will be more
appropriate that, depending upon the level of the institution, whether it be a primary or secondary or
high school or a college, professional or otherwise, and on the population and
educational needs of the area in which the institution is to be located, the
state properly balances the interests of all by providing for such a percentage
of students of the minority community to be admitted, so as to adequately serve
the interest of the community for which the institution was established.
152. At the same time, the admissions
to aided institutions, whether awarded to minority or
non-minority students, cannot be at the absolute sweet will and pleasure of the
management of minority educational institutions. As the regulations to promote academic
excellence and standards do not encroach upon the guaranteed rights under
Article 30, the aided minority educational institutions can be required to
observe inter se merit amongst the eligible minority applicants and passage of
common entrance test by the candidates, where there is one, with regard to
admissions in professional and non-professional colleges. If there is no such test, a rational method
of assessing comparative merit has to be evolved. As regards the non-minority
segment, admission may be on the basis of the common entrance test and
counselling by a state agency. In the
courses for which such a test and counselling are not in vogue, admission can
be on the basis of relevant criteria for the
determination of merit. It would be open
to the state authorities to insist on allocating a certain percentage of seats
to those belonging to weaker sections of society, from amongst the non-minority
seats.
153. We would, however, like to
clarify one important aspect at this stage. The aided linguistic minority
educational institution is given the right to admit students belonging to the
linguistic minority to a reasonable extent only to ensure that its minority
character is preserved and that the objective of establishing the institution
is not defeated. If so, such an
institution is under an obligation to admit the bulk of the students fitting
into the description of the minority community. Therefore, the students of that
group residing in the state in which the institution is located have to be
necessarily admitted in a large measure because they constitute the linguistic
minority group as far as that state is concerned. In other words, the predominance of linguistic
students hailing from the state in which the minority educational institution
is established should be present. The
management bodies of such institutions cannot resort to the device of admitting
the linguistic students of the adjoining state in which they are in a majority,
under the faade of the protection given under Article 30(1). If not, the very objective of conferring the preferential
right of admission by harmoniously constructing Articles 30(1) and 29(2),
which we have done above, may be distorted.
154. We are rightly proud of being the
largest democracy in the world. The essential ingredient
of democracy is the will and the right of the people to electtheir
representatives from amongst whom a government is formed.
155. It will be wrong to presume that
the government or the legislature will act against the Constitution or contrary
to the public or national interest at all times. Viewing
every action of the government with skepticism, and with the belief that it must
be invalid unless proved otherwise, goes against the democratic form of
government. It is no doubt true that the
Court has the power and the function to see that no one including the government
acts contrary to the law, but the cardinal principle of our jurisprudence is
that it is for the person who alleges that the law has been violated to prove it
to be so. In such an event, the action
of the government or the authority may have to be carefully examined, but it is improper
to proceed on the assumption that, merely because an allegation is made, the
action impugned or taken must be bad in law.
Such being the position, when the government frames rules and
regulations or lays down norms, especially with regard to education, one must
assume that unless shown otherwise, the action taken is in accordance with
law. Therefore, it will not be in order
to so interpret a Constitution, and Articles 29 and 30 in particular, on the
presumption that the state will normally not act in the interest of the general
public or in the interests of concerned sections of the society.
CONCLUSION
Equality and Secularism
156. Our country is often depicted as
a person in the form of "Bharat Mata Mother India". The people of India are regarded as her children with
their welfare being in her heart. Like any loving mother, the welfare of the
family is of paramount importance for her.
157. For a healthy family, it is
important that each member is strong and healthy. But then, all members do not have the same
constitution, whether physical and/or mental.
For harmonious and healthy growth, it is but natural for the parents, and the
mother in particular, to give more attention and food to the weaker child so as
to help him/her become stronger. Giving
extra food and attention and ensuring private tuition to help in his/her
studies will, in a sense, amount to giving the weaker child preferential
treatment. Just as lending physical support
to the aged and the infirm, or providing a special diet, cannot be regarded as
unfair or unjust, similarly, conferring certain rights on a special class, for
good reasons, cannot be considered inequitable.
All the people of India are not alike, and that is why preferential
treatment to a special section of the society is not frowned upon. Article 30 is a special right conferred on
the religious and linguistic
minorities because of
their numerical handicap and to instill in them a sense of
security and confidence,
even though the minorities cannot be per se regarded as weaker sections or
underprivileged segments of the society.
158. The one billion population of
India consists of six main ethnic groups and fifty-two major tribes; six major
religions and 6,400 castes and sub-castes; eighteen major languages and 1,600
minor languages and dialects. The
essence of secularism in India can best be depicted if a relief map of India is
made in mosaic, where the aforesaid one billion people are the small pieces of
marble that go into the making of a map.
Each person, whatever his/her language, caste, religion has his/her
individual identity, which has to be preserved, so that when pieced together it
goes to form a depiction with the different geographical features of India. These small pieces of marble, in the form of
human beings, which may individually be dissimilar to each other, when placed
together in a systematic manner, produce the beautiful map of India. Each piece, like a citizen of
India, plays an important part in making of the whole. The variations of the colours as well as different shades of the same colour in a map
is the result of these small pieces of different shades and colours of marble,
but even when one small piece of marble is removed, the whole map of India
would be scarred, and the beauty would be lost.
159. Each of the people of India has
an important place in the formation of the nation. Each piece has to retain its own colour. By itself, it may be an insignificant stone,
but when placed in a proper manner, goes into the making of a full picture of
India in all its different colours and hues.
160. A citizen of India stands in a
similar position. The Constitution recognizes the differences
among the people of India, but it gives equal importance to each of them, their
differences notwithstanding, for only then can there be a unified secular
nation. Recognizing the need for the
preservation and retention of different pieces that go into the making of a
whole nation, the Constitution, while maintaining, inter alia, the basic
principle of equality, contains adequate provisions that ensure the
preservation of these different pieces.
161. The essence of secularism in
India is the recognition and preservation
of the different types of people, with diverse languages and different
beliefs, and placing them together so as to form a whole and united India. Articles 29 and 30 do not more than seek to
preserve the differences that exist, and at the same time, unite the people to
form one strong nation.
ANSWERS TO ELEVEN
QUESTIONS:
Q.1. What is the meaning and content of the
expression "minorities" in Article 30 of the Constitution of India?
A. Linguistic and religious minorities are covered by the
expression "minority" under Article 30 of the Constitution. Since reorganization of the States in India
has been on linguistic lines, therefore, for the purpose of determining the
minority, the unit will be the State and not the whole of India. Thus, religious and linguistic minorities,
who have been put at par in Article 30, have to be considered
State-wise.
Q.2. What is meant by the expression
"religion" in Article 30(1)? Can the followers of a sect or
denomination of a particular religion claim protection under Article 30(1) on the
basis that they constitute a minority in the State, even though the followers
of that religion are in majority in that State?
A. This question need not be answered by this Bench; i will be
dealt with by a regular Bench.
Q.3(a) What are the
indicia for treating an educational institution as a minority educational institution?
Would an institution be regarded as a minority educational institution
because it was established by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic
minority or its being administered by a person(s) belonging to a religious
or linguistic minority?
A. This question need not be answered by this Bench; it will be
dealt with by a regular Bench.
Q3(b) To what extent can professional education be
treated as a matter coming under minorities rights under Article 30?
A. Article 30(1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the
right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice. The use of
the words "of their
choice" indicates that even professional educational institutions would
be covered by Article 30.
Q.4. Whether the admission of students to
minority educational institution, whether aided or unaided,
can be regulated by the State Government or by the University to which
the institution is affiliated?
A. Admission of students to unaided minority educational
institutions, viz., schools and undergraduate
colleges where the scope for merit-based selection is practically
nil, cannot be regulated by the concerned State or University, except for
providing the qualifications and minimum conditions of eligibility in the
interest of academic standards. The right to admit students being an essential
facet of the right to administer educational institutions of their choice, as
contemplated under Article 30 of the Constitution, the state government or the
university may not be entitled to interfere with that right, so long as the
admission to the unaided educational institutions is on a transparent basis and
the merit is adequately taken care of.
The right to administer, not being absolute, there could be regulatory
measures for ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof,
and it is more so in the matter of admissions to professional institutions. A
minority institution does not cease to be so, the moment grant-in- aid is
received by the institution. An aided
minority educational institution, therefore, would be entitled to have the right
of admission of students belonging to the minority group and at the same time,
would be required to admit a reasonable extent of non-minority students, so
that the rights under Article 30(1) are not substantially impaired and further
the citizens' rights under Article 29(2) are not infringed. What would be a reasonable extent, would
vary from the types of institution, the courses of education for which admission
is being sought and other factors like educational needs. The concerned State Government has to notify
the percentage of the non-minority students to be admitted in the light of the
above observations. Observance of inter se merit amongst the applicants
belonging to the minority group could be ensured. In the case of aided professional institutions,
it can also be stipulated that passing of the common entrance test held by the
state agency is necessary to seek admission.
As regards non-minority students who are eligible to seek admission for
the remaining seats, admission should normally be on the basis of the common
entrance test held by the state agency followed by counselling wherever it
exists.
Q5(a) Whether the minority's rights to establish and
administer educational institutions of their
choice will include the procedure and method of admission and selection of
students?
A. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method
of admission as well as selection of students, but such a procedure must be
fair and transparent, and the selection of students in professional and higher education colleges should
be on the basis of merit. The procedure
adopted or selection made should
not be tantamount to mal-administration.
Even an unaided minority
institution ought not to ignore the merit of the students for admission, while
exercising its right to admit students to the colleges aforesaid, as in that
event, the institution will fail to achieve excellence.
Q5(b) Whether the minority institutions' right of
admission of students and to lay down procedure and method of admission, if
any, would be affected in any way by the receipt of
State aid?
A. While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be
permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by-rules or regulations,
the conditions on the basis of which
admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled
with the reservation policy of the state qua non-minority students. The merit may be determined either through a
common entrance test conducted by
the concerned University or the Government followed by counselling,
or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual institutions the method to be followed is for the
university or the government to decide. The authority may also devise other means to
ensure that admission is granted
to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case of such institutions, it will be
permissible for the government or the
university to provide that consideration should be shown to the
weaker sections of the society.
Q5(c) Whether the statutory provisions which
regulate the facets of administration like control over educational agencies,
control over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation including
recognition/withdrawal thereof, and appointment of staff,
employees, teachers and Principals including their service conditions and
regulation of fees, etc. would interfere with the right of administration of
minorities?
A. So far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of
administration are concerned, in case of
an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of
control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the
conditions of affiliation to an university or board have to be complied with,
but in the matter of day-to-day management, like the appointment of staff,
teaching and non-teaching, and administrative control over them, the
management should have the freedom and there should not be any external
controlling agency. However, a rational procedure for the
selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved
by the management itself. For redressing the grievances of employees of aided
and unaided institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination from
service, a mechanism will have to be evolved, and in our opinion, appropriate
tribunals could be constituted, and till then, such tribunals could be presided
over by a Judicial Officer of the rank of District Judge. The State or other
controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualification,
experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an
individual for being appointed as a teacher or a principal of any
educational institution. Regulations can be framed governing service conditions
for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State, without
interfering with the overall administrative control of the management over the
staff. Fees to be charged by
unaided institutions cannot be regulated but no institution should charge
capitation fee.
Q6(a) Where can a minority institution be
operationally located? Where a religious or linguistic minority in State 'A'
establishes an educational institution in the said State, can such educational
institution grant preferential admission/reservations and
other benefits to members of the religious/linguistic group from other States
where they are non-minorities?
A. This question need not be answered by this Bench; it will be
dealt with by a regular Bench.
Q6(b) Whether it would be correct to say that only
the members of that minority residing in State 'A' will be treated as the
members of the minority vis—vis such institution?
A. This question need not be answered by this Bench; it will be
dealt with by a regular Bench.
Q.7 Whether the member of a linguistic non-minority in one State can
establish a trust/society in another State and claim minority status in that
State?
A. This question need not be answered by this Bench; it will be
dealt with by a regular Bench.
Q.8 Whether the ratio laid down by this Court in the St. Stephen's
case (St. Stephen's College vs.
University of Delhi [(1992) 1 SCC 558] is correct? If no, what
order?
A. The basic ratio laid down by this Court in the St. Stephen's
College case is correct, as indicated in
this judgment. However, rigid percentage
cannot be stipulated. It has to be left to authorities to prescribe
a reasonable percentage having regard
to the type of institution, population and educational
needs of minorities.
Q.9 Whether the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan J.P. vs.
State of A.P. [(1993) 1 SCC 645] (except
where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right) and the
scheme framed thereunder require reconsideration/modification
and if yes, what?
A. The scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan's case and
the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education
is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional.
However, the principle that there should not be capitation
fee or profiteering is correct.
Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and
augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to
profiteering.
Q.10 Whether the non-minorities have the right to
establish and administer educational institution
under Articles 21 and 29(1) read with Articles 14 and 15(1), in the same manner
and to the same extent as minority institutions?
and
Q.11 What is the meaning of the expressions
"Education" and "Educational Institutions" in
various provisions of the Constitution? Is the right to establish and administer
educational institutions guaranteed under the Constitution?
A. The expression "education" in the Articles of the
Constitution means and includes education at all
levels from the primary school level upto the post-graduate level. It includes professional
education. The expression "educational
institutions" means institutions that impart education, where "education" is
as understood hereinabove. The right to establish and administer educational
institutions is guaranteed under the
Constitution to all citizens under Articles 19(1)(g) and 26, and to minorities
specifically under Article 30. All
citizens have a right to establish and administer educational institutions under Articles 19(1)(g) and 26, but this right
is subject to the provisions of Articles 19(6) and 26(a). However, minority
institutions will have a right to admit students belonging to the minority
group, in the manner as discussed in this judgment.